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ABSTRACT
This dissertation studies an economy where efficiency depends on the correct
match between projects and two experts. A low-skill expert has low fixed cost and
low productivity, so he is more efficient in handling low-potential or low-difficulty
projects. And the opposite is true for a high-skill expert. The dissertation studies
the effectiveness of markets and organizations in overcoming asymmetric information
issues, experts’ incentives to acquire project information at a cost, and how experts
use the information to facilitate the correct match.
The first chapter studies a market where a referring expert privately knows a
project’s potential and may refer it at any price. Inspection benefits the referred
expert. First, it allows him to find out the project’s potential before accepting the
referral offer. Second, it allows him to tailor production effort to the project’s poten-
tial for maximum efficiency. In equilibrium, the referring expert pools projects into
subsets and refers each subset at a different price. A higher price signals a subset of
projects with higher potentials. The referred expert almost always inspects and then
uses the information to make the acceptance decision. Each subset must be small
v
enough to incentivize the referral at a price, but also large enough to incentivize
inspection by the referred expert.
The second chapter studies contract design within an organization. A principal
has to rely on the two experts to learn about projects’ difficulties. If information cost
is small, the principal can implement the first best by an optimal mechanism with the
low-skill expert acting as a gatekeeper. The low-skill gatekeeper expert is incentivized
to acquire information and report it truthfully. Subsequently, the principal efficiently
assigns the project based on the report.
The third chapter studies a market where each of the two experts can exert a
variable effort to acquire project information imperfectly. In the first best, experts
coordinate their information acquisition efforts. In the market, either one or both
experts acquire information. The two experts may fail to coordinate because one
acquires information for efficient match but the other acquires information again to
protect himself.
vi
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1Chapter 1
Referral and Inspection
1.1 Introduction
Market referral is a common business practice in many industries. For example, a
small firm with low overhead cost can implement simple projects efficiently, but may
lack the technology to exploit the full potential of complex projects. Therefore, the
small firm may choose to refer complex projects to a specialized firm in the market for
a fee. Conversely, a specialized firm with high overhead cost may find it worthwhile
to refer simple projects to a small firm. Referrals are very commonly observed in the
accounting, construction, consulting, and financial industries, etc.
Despite the prevalence of market referrals, recent research by Garicano and Santos
(2004) and Grassi and Ma (2016) maintain that the referral market would unravel
due to asymmetric information. In this chapter, I provide a model to demonstrate the
referral market’s effectiveness in matching projects to firms in the presence of hidden
action, hidden information, and endogenous information acquisition. In contrast to
the extant literature, I introduce information acquisition to my model; a firm may
inspect a project before accepting a referral. The intuition is that a firm inspects
not only to discern a project’s profitability, but also to tailor its effort for maximum
efficiency. I show that both forces play a key role in eliminating adverse selection and
preventing the market from unraveling.
2My model includes a set of projects and each project has a different productivity
potential. There are two firms, a low-skill firm and a high-skill firm. Each firm can
implement a project by incurring a fixed cost and exerting a variable effort that is
tailored to the project potential. A project’s return is a strictly concave single-peaked
function in effort, and effort and project potential are complements in production.
Each firm can achieve a higher return by implementing a project with higher potential,
but the two firms have different comparative advantages. The low-skill firm has low
productivity and low cost and the opposite is true for the high-skill firm. In the
first best, the low-skill firm implements low-potential projects and the high-skill firm
implements high-potential projects.
I study two types of markets which I call ascending referral and descending referral.
In ascending referral, the low-skill firm has private information about a project and
can decide whether to implement the project or refer it to the high-skill firm at a price.
In descending referral, firms’ roles are interchanged; the high-skill firm has private
information about a project and can decide whether to implement or refer it to the
low-skill firm. I first study ascending referral. If the low-skill firm decides to make
a referral, then the high-skill firm can inspect the project potential at a cost before
accepting or rejecting the offer. If the high-skill firm accepts, then it chooses effort
to implement the project subject to the project’s potential. The referral market
is undermined by asymmetric information: (1) only the low-skill firm has private
information about the project when the referral offer is made, and (2) inspection as
well as project effort are the high-skill firm’s hidden actions.
Inspection can benefit the high-skill firm through two channels. First, it enables
the high-skill firm to avoid unprofitable projects. Second, inspection allows the high-
3skill firm to choose its effort optimally. I show that the high-skill firm must inspect
every referred project in equilibrium. Otherwise, the low-skill firm would exploit the
opportunity and refer low-potential projects to the high-skill firm at a high price, and
the market would unravel. However, in equilibrium, the high-skill firm’s incentive to
inspect is not to reject unprofitable projects. The reason is that the low-skill firm’s
incentive to refer lemons is restrained if it expects the high-skill firm to inspect.
Instead, the high-skill firm’s inspection stems from the second channel: its incentive
to tailor effort to implement projects with maximum efficiency.
A referral equilibrium, one in which the low-skill firm successfully refers projects
to the high-skill firm, exists if and only if the inspection cost is small. An equilibrium
is partial-pooling; the low-skill firm pools projects into convex subsets and refer each
subset at a different price. A project with higher potential is referred at a higher
price. Each equilibrium referred subset must be small enough to incentivize the
referral, but must also be large enough to incentivize the high-skill firm’s inspection.
The high-skill firm always inspects and always accepts, although the firm can infer the
project’s conditional distribution from equilibrium prices. It is costly for the low-skill
firm to make referrals because the firm has to pool different subsets of projects at
different prices. Therefore, the low-skill firm refers fewer projects than the first best.
However, the high-skill firm implements each referred project efficiently and the only
inefficiency stems from the high-skill firm’s inspection and insufficient referrals.
I then study descending referral in which the high-skill firm can refer a project
to the low-skill firm. In contrast to ascending referral, there are some referrals in
any equilibrium regardless of the magnitude of the inspection cost. The reason is
that the low-skill firm can generate a positive surplus for projects with any potential
4because of its low fixed cost. On the other hand, the high-skill firm cannot generate a
positive surplus for projects with very low potential. Therefore, the high-skill firm is
willing to send these low-potential projects away with little or no compensation. As
a result, there are two classes of equilibria. An equilibrium in the first class is similar
to an equilibrium in ascending referral; the low-skill firm accepts a referral only after
inspection. The second class has a minor difference; the low-skill firm accepts the
lowest equilibrium price without inspection, and it accepts other higher equilibrium
prices only after inspection. Without inspection, the low-skill firm’s project effort on
a referred project at the lowest equilibrium price is not efficient.
I also consider two extensions for ascending referral.1 In the first extension, I allow
inspection to be contractible. In equilibrium, the low-skill firm refers each project at
a different price by paying for the inspection cost, so the high-skill firm must inspect.
The high-skill firm still accepts referral only after inspection but the low-skill firm no
longer leaves any rent to the high-skill firm. I find that all equilibria are separating
and there is a unique equilibrium allocation. In equilibrium, low-potential projects
are implemented by the low-skill firm and high-potential projects by the high-skill
firm, but the equilibrium threshold is higher than the first-best threshold. In the
second extension, I endogenize the low-skill firm’s information on project potential.
In the beginning of the game, the low-skill firm must decide whether to learn about
a project’s potential by incurring an inspection cost. I show that if the inspection
cost is small, then the low-skill firm always inspects a project before implementing or
referring it. In this sense, my main result is robust to treating all firms as only able
to learn the project potential through inspection.
1The extensions also apply to descending referral.
5In the final section, I discuss how my model can be reinterpreted to understand
subcontracting in the construction industry. In the modified model, a contractor can
complete a project by tailoring effort to reduce construction cost. The cost-minimizing
effort for a contractor depends on the project difficulty. A more difficult project costs a
contractor more to complete, but a completed project yields a fixed return regardless
of the project’s difficulty. Unlike the referral game, in a subcontracting game, a
contractor cannot sell the ownership of a project. However, he can subcontract the
project completion right by offering a fixed payment and the subcontractor can inspect
the project before accepting the offer. The analysis and results are similar to the
main model’s. In equilibrium, a contractor pools projects into convex subsets and
subcontracts each subset at a different payment. The subcontractor inspects a project
at all but the highest equilibrium payment. He may or may not inspect at the highest
equilibrium payment depending on the size of the corresponding subset.
The modified model’s setup and results resonate with the practices in the construc-
tion industry. According to Carty (1995), practitioners in the construction industry
use a lump-sum (fixed-price) contract “when the scope of work is clearly defined and
understood by both parties to the contract.” This supports the usage of a fixed price
contract in my model since the “scope of work” in a subcontract is the completion of
a project, which I assume to be a contractible event. Moreover, Kaplanogu and Arditi
(2008) conduct a survey of the top 400 construction companies in the world and find
that 78% of the contractors “evaluate the status of a project prior to committing”
to an agreement. Those contractors who do not conduct “pre-project” inspection
cite “the cost of the process and the lack of the appropriate company culture and
resources” as their reason for not inspecting. This is consistent with the model’s pre-
diction that subcontractors who receive a project almost always inspect it and they
6do not evaluate the project before accepting if the inspection cost is too high. Sec-
ondly, according to Kaplanogu and Arditi (2008), the contractors cite the evaluation
of “appropriateness of schedule” as one of the main reasons for them to carry out
“pre-project” inspection. This matches my result that a contractor inspects to tailor
its effort for maximum efficiency in an equilibrium. Lastly, subcontracts of various
lump-sum values are observed in reality. This is in line with the chapter’s analysis
that there exist equilibria with multiple equilibrium subcontract payments as long as
the inspection cost is small.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.1.1 provides a
review of the literature. Section 1.2 presents the model setup and the first best.
Section 1.3 studies an ascending referral market in which the low-skill firm may refer to
the high-skill firm. Section 1.4 studies a descending referral market where firms’ roles
are interchanged. Section 1.5 discusses equilibrium selection. Section 1.6 considers
two extensions of the main model. Section 1.7 presents a modified version of the
model in order to understand subcontracting in the construction industry. Section
1.8 concludes. Finally, the Appendix contains proofs of results.
1.1.1 Literature Review
My model is closely related to two papers on referrals when firms differ in marginal
productivities and fixed costs.2 In Garicano and Santos (2004), an informed firm may
refer a project by either a fixed-price or an output-sharing contract. The potential
of a project is either high or low, and effort is required for production. In a mar-
ket equilibrium, ascending referral may be inefficient and may unravel completely,
2The literature calls them agents or experts. I call them firms to emphasize the chapter’s focus
on market referral.
7whereas descending referral is first-best.3 In Grassi and Ma (2016), a referring firm
may exert effort to acquire a continuous signal about a project’s cost before referring
it to another firm at a price. In an equilibrium, only one of the two firms acquires
information about a project and successfully refers it to the other. In both papers,
the referred firm cannot acquire information and a market cannot support two-way
referral.4 My chapter demonstrates that the referred firm’s inspection can solve the
asymmetric information problem and leads to richer results. First, market referral
can be two-way; either firm can refer projects to the other. Second, in an equilib-
rium, projects with different potentials can be referred at different equilibrium prices.
Third, inspection leads to efficient project implementation.
My chapter contributes to the adverse selection literature when a seller is privately
informed in a market. Chan and Leland (1982) and Bester and Ritzberger (2001)
assume that a buyer can become fully informed about product quality at a cost,
whereas Martin (2017) assumes that the buyer is rational inattentive to product
quality. My model adopts a simple information acquisition technology under a richer
environment; unlike a buyer purchasing a product, a firm can implement a project
with a variable effort after accepting a referral. I point out that a referred firm can
use project information to make acceptance decision as well as tailor its production
effort. This intuition allows me to solve an otherwise challenging problem.
Garicano (2000) and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2004, 2006) propose a frame-
work in which an agent carries out production by solving a problem. Each problem
3My chapter uses a framework with continuous project type and a more general project return
function. Because of the former assumption, the first-best result in the descending referral market
of Garicano and Santos (2004) does not extend to my model.
4Both papers consider how a non-market institution may allow two-way referral. However, my
chapter shows that a market is sufficient to sustain two-way referral.
8differs in difficulty but has the same binary production outcome; it is either solved
or not solved. Agents differ in their knowledge in solving a problem. Using this
framework, Fuchs and Garicano (2010) and Fuchs, Garicano, and Rayo (2015) study
a referral problem in which agents’ knowledge and the referred problem’s difficulty
are private information. My model uses a different framework; production return is a
continuous function of production effort and project potential. My focus is on refer-
ral in the presence of private production effort, project information, and information
acquisition when firms’ productivities and costs are common knowledge.
Information acquisition by an agent before contract acceptance in a principal-agent
model has been considered in the previous literature.5 Cre´mer and Khalil (1992) and
Terstiege (2016) assume that the agent either acquires information at a cost before
signing a contract or it learns at no cost after signing it. Cre´mer et al. (1998a)
assume that if the agent does not acquire information before signing, then he only
finds out the information ex-post after production. My chapter uses this approach.
In contrast to the principal-agent literature, my chapter assumes that the referring
firm is privately informed and it can only use a simple price contract.6 However,
in equilibrium, the referring firm uses the simple contract to share rent such that
the referred firm inspects. The referred firm’s inspection is redundant but prevents
markets from unraveling and maximizes production efficiency.
5Other papers allow information to be acquired at different stages of the extensive form. The
literature shows that timing matters. Cre´mer and Khalil (1994) and Cre´mer et al. (1998b) assume
that the agent can acquire information before a contract is offered. Lewis and Sappington (1997)
and Iossa and Martimort (2015) assume that the agent can acquire information after agreeing to a
contract. In my chapter, the referred firm must acquire information before signing a deal in order
to deter lemons.
6In Mezzetti and Tsoulouhas (2000), the principal is privately informed and agent’s information
acquisition is observable. The latter assumption allows them to concentrate on multiple rounds of
contract proposal.
91.2 Model
1.2.1 Projects, Firms, and Information Structure
There is a set of projects with total mass set at 1. Each project is indexed by a
productivity potential q, which is a random variable distributed on a support Q ≡
[0, q¯], with a continuous distribution function and a density function G(·) and g(·),
respectively.7
There are two risk-neutral firms, a low-skill firm and a high-skill firm. Each of
them can implement a project. The low-skill firm can incur a fixed cost fl and exert
a variable effort e on a project q for a return of yl(e, q), and the high-skill firm can
incur a fixed cost fh and exert an effort e on a project q for a return of yh(e, q). Let
the return functions be yi : R+ ×Q→ R, i = l, h. Given an effort e and a project q,
a firm’s return can be interpreted as project q’s output net of firm’s effort disutility.
I make the following assumptions on the return functions. First, the return functions
are strictly increasing in project potential q; ∂yl(e,q)
∂q
> 0 and ∂yh(e,q)
∂q
> 0. Second,
the return functions yl(e, q) and yh(e, q) are twice-differentiable and strictly concave
in e. Also, maxe yl(e, 0) = maxe yh(e, 0) = 0 and yl(0, q) = yh(0, q) = 0 for ∀q ∈ Q.
Given a project with positive potential q, yl(e, q) and yh(e, q) each achieves an interior
maximum at a positive number at a positive effort e. Finally, effort e and project
potential q are complementary in production. That is, the cross derivatives of the
return functions are positive; ∂
2yl(e,q)
∂e∂q
> 0 and ∂
2yh(e,q)
∂e∂q
> 0.
The two firms have different comparative advantages. The high-skill firm has to
incur a higher fixed cost than the low-skill firm in order to implement a project. I
also normalize the low-skill firm’s fixed cost to be zero, so fh > fl = 0. However, the
7Throughout the chapter, I use project q and project with potential q interchangeably.
10
high-skill firm is more productive than the low-skill firm. First, given a project q and
an effort e, the high-skill firm generates a higher return than the low-skill firm, which
means yh(e, q) > yl(e, q). Second, the high-skill firm has a weakly higher marginal
return of effort than the low-skill firm; ∂yh(e,q)
∂e
≥ ∂yl(e,q)
∂e
. Third, a project with a
higher potential enhances the high-skill firm’s return more than the low-skill firm’s;
∂yh(e,q)
∂q
> ∂yl(e,q)
∂q
.8 Finally, I assume that maxe yh(e, q¯) − fh > maxe yl(e, q¯). This
assumption makes sure that the high-skill firm generates a higher surplus than the
low-skill firm for some projects, when each firm exerts surplus-maximizing effort on
the project.
Two information structures are included in the model. In the first, a firm is
privately informed about a project’s potential. In the second, a firm can inspect and
learn about a project’s potential at a cost c.
1.2.2 First Best
An allocation is an assignment of a project q to one of the firms and a production
effort by the assigned firm. The first-best allocation is one that maximizes project q’s
expected surplus. In the first best, a project q is assigned to the firm who can generate
the highest surplus. The assigned firm chooses an effort to maximize project q’s sur-
plus. If the low-skill firm is the assigned firm, it chooses effort eˆl(q) ≡ argmaxeyl(e, q).
Alternatively, the high-skill firm chooses effort eˆh(q) ≡ argmaxe{yh(e, q)− fh}. I call
eˆl(q) and eˆh(q) the low-skill and the high-skill firms’ efficient efforts, respectively.
They are one-to-one functions of project potential q, because each return function
8Here is an example of the return functions that satisfy the assumptions I just introduced:
yl(e, q) = eq − φ(e) and yh(e, q) = req − φ(e), with r > 1, φ(0) = 0, φ′ > 0 and φ′′ > 0. A
firm’s return function consists of two separable functions. The first is a multiplicative production
function and the second is a convex disutility function. This separable functional form is the one
Garicano and Santos (2004) adopt.
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is strictly concave and has an interior maximum in project potential q. Lemma 1
characterizes firms’ efficient effort functions (proof in the Appendix).
Lemma 1 Let eˆl(q) ≡ argmaxeyl(e, q) and eˆh(q) ≡ argmaxe{yh(e, q) − fh}. Then,
for ∀q ∈ Q,
(i) eˆh(q) ≥ eˆl(q), and
(ii) deˆl(q)
dq
> 0 and deˆh(q)
dq
> 0.
The high-skill firm’s efficient effort to implement a project with positive potential
is higher than the low-skill firm’s, because the high-skill firm has a higher marginal
return of effort and the return functions are strictly concave in effort. Furthermore,
each firms’ efficient effort is an increasing function of project potential. This is due to
two assumptions. First, effort and project potential are complementary in production.
Second, return functions are strictly concave in effort. To save on notations, define
the low-skill firm’s efficient surplus of project q to be Sl(q) ≡ yl(eˆl(q), q), and the
high-skill firm’s efficient surplus of project q to be Sh(q) ≡ yh(eˆh(q), q) − fh. With
the new notations, the assumption maxe yh(e, q¯) − fh > maxe yl(e, q¯) translates into
Sh(q¯) > Sl(q¯). Lemma 2 characterizes firms’ efficient surplus functions (proof in the
Appendix).
Lemma 2 Let Sl(q) ≡ maxe yl(e, q) and Sh(q) ≡ maxe yh(e, q)− fh. Then dSh(q)dq >
dSl(q)
dq
> 0 for q ∈ Q. There exists a unique qfb ∈ Q such that Sl(q) > Sh(q) for
q < qfb, Sl(q) < Sh(q) for q > q
fb, and Sl(q
fb) = Sh(q
fb). Also, there exists a unique
q∗ such that Sh(q∗) = 0.
12
Sh HqL
Sl HqL
qfb q
-fh
Figure 1·1: First-best allocation
Lemma 2 is summarized in Figure 1.1. The solid line denotes the high-skill firm’s
efficient surplus Sh(q) and the bold line denotes the low-skill firm’s efficient surplus
Sl(q).
9 As project potential q increases, Sh(q) increases faster than Sl(q), because (i)
the high-skill firm has a higher marginal return of project potential, (ii) the high-skill
firm’s efficient effort is higher than the low-skill firm’s by Lemma 1, and (iii) the cross
derivative of a return function is positive. However, the high-skill firm’s fixed cost is
higher than the low-skill firm’s. Hence, the low-skill firm is more efficient for projects
with potential lower than qfb, whereas the high-skill firm is more efficient for projects
with potential higher than qfb. To sum up, the first-best allocation is: (i) q < qfb is
assigned to the low-skill firm, q ≥ qfb is assigned to the high-skill firm, and (ii) the
assigned firm exerts efficient effort on the assigned project.
Finally, for future references, define S−1l (x) as the inverse function of Sl(q) such
9Sl(q) and Sh(q) are not necessarily convex functions as depicted.
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that S−1l (Sl(q)) = q and S
−1
h (x) as the inverse function of Sh(q) such that S
−1
h (Sh(q)) =
q. They are well-defined functions because the efficient surplus functions are strictly
increasing.
1.3 Ascending Referral
I consider two types of markets which I call ascending referral and descending referral.
In ascending referral, the low-skill firm can implement a project or refer it to the high-
skill firm. The extensive form of ascending referral is:
Stage 1: The low-skill firm has a project with potential q determined by distribution
G. The firm has private information about the project potential q. It decides
between implementing the project itself and referring the project to the high-
skill firm. The low-skill firm implements the project by choosing an effort e and
incurring a fixed cost fl, whereas it refers the project by choosing a price p.
Stage 2: The high-skill firm decides whether or not to inspect the referred project
at an inspection cost c. The firm then decides whether or not to accept the
referral. If it accepts, it pays p to the low-skill firm and implements the project
by choosing an effort e and incurring a fixed cost fh. If the high-skill firm
rejects, the game ends.
Descending referral has the roles of the firms interchanged. I study both markets
but the analysis of the two markets are similar. I present the analysis of ascending
referral in detail in this section and indicate how the two markets differ in the next
section.
The extensive form has the following features. Project potentials’ distribution,
return functions, fixed costs and inspection cost are firms’ common knowledge. The
14
low-skill firm is privately informed about the project potential, but the high-skill firm
may privately inspect and learn about the project potential at an inspection cost
before accepting or rejecting the referral. Last but not least, a firm’s project effort
and return are its hidden action and hidden information, respectively. In Section
1.6, I extend the model so that the high-skill firm’s inspection is contractible. I also
endogenize the low-skill firm’s information.
In this environment the only contractible event is a transfer of project ownership,
thus the low-skill firm refers a project with a fixed-price contract. Why is project
return not contractible? Project return depends on both project potential and im-
plementation effort, and it is generated in a complex way. In order to enforce a
return-sharing contract, the referring firm needs to constantly monitor the referred
firm’s production process. This may be very costly. In addition, an outstanding
work performance on a project may lead to future business opportunities through
reputation effect, and reputation is typically not contractible.
Note that the game ends if the high-skill firm rejects a referral in stage 2. One can
consider an alternative game in which the low-skill firm must implement a rejected
project with a delay cost  > 0. I discuss how the alternative game is equivalent to
the above game in Section 1.3.5.
1.3.1 Strategies and Beliefs
I define firms’ strategies and the high-skill firm’s belief in this section. First, the
low-skill firm’s strategy is defined by (i) a production effort if it decides to work on
a project, and (ii) a referral price if it decides to refer the project to the high-skill
firm. The low-skill firm’s strategy is a function of project potential. Second, the
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high-skill firm’s strategy is defined by (i) a decision whether to inspect a referred
project, (ii) a decision whether to accept the referral, and (iii) a production effort if it
accepts the referral. The high-skill firm’s inspection decision is a function of referral
price. Its acceptance decision and production effort are functions of referral price and
inspection information.
I only consider referral prices in between zero and Sh(q¯), which is without loss
of generality. The low-skill firm can obtain a surplus weakly higher than zero with
any project, so it would not offer a referral price lower than or equal to zero. The
high-skill firm always rejects a price higher than Sh(q¯) because it cannot obtain a
surplus higher than Sh(q¯) with any project. Upon receiving a price offer p in stage
2, the high-skill firm forms a belief about the project potential. The high-skill firm’s
belief about a project with potential q is a density function µ : (0, Sh(q¯)]×Q→ R+,
so µ(p, q) is the probability density that the high-skill firm assigns to project q when
the referral price is p, with
∫
Q
µ(p, x)dx = 1. I assume that the low-skill firm prefers
referring a project to implementing it when it is indifferent. Also, I assume that the
high-skill firm prefers accepting a referral when it is indifferent.
A tuple of strategies and belief is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the ascending
referral game if the strategies are mutual best responses given the belief and the
belief is obtained from the strategies by Bayes’ rule whenever possible. I restrict
my attention to pure strategy equilibria. I also impose the following assumption to
facilitate my analysis.
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Assumption A
For all qˆ > qfb, c ≤ 1
G(qˆ)
qˆ∫
0
Sh(q)dG(q)−max
e
1
G(qˆ)
qˆ∫
0
[
yh(e, q)− fh
]
dG(q).
(1.1)
To understand Assumption A, consider a project q from the subset (0, qˆ), with
qˆ > qfb. What is the high-skill firm’s expected surplus of implementing the project?
The first term on the right-hand side of the inequality is the high-skill firm’s expected
surplus of implementing the project q with full information. The high-skill firm im-
plements the project by choosing its efficient effort according to project potential.
The second term on the right-hand side is the high-skill firm’s expected surplus of
implementing the project only knowing that the project q is from the subset (0, qˆ).
The high-skill firm implements the project by choosing an average effort. The differ-
ence in surplus on the right-hand side is always positive. Assumption A says that,
if the high-skill firm has a project from the subset (0, qˆ), with qˆ > qfb, then the
inspection cost is smaller than the difference in surplus on the right-hand side. The
high-skill firm wants to inspect project q before implementing it. I discuss the impli-
cation of relaxing Assumption A at the end of this section. I rewrite Assumption A
for simplicity.
Assumption A c ≤ cA ≡ minqˆ>qfb
{
1
G(qˆ)
∫ qˆ
0
Sh(q)dG(q) −maxe 1G(qˆ)
∫ qˆ
0
[
yh(e, q) −
fh
]
dG(q)
}
.
In the rest of the section, I construct equilibria with the following characteristics.
The low-skill firm works on some projects and refers others. Different subsets of
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project may be referred at different prices. Although the high-skill firm can infer
a referred project’s conditional distribution through an equilibrium referral price, it
always inspects the referred project and always accepts it. As will be shown, they
are the only equilibria where projects are referred. I first present some necessary
conditions of an equilibrium, then I show that they are sufficient as well.
1.3.2 The High-skill Firm’s Equilibrium Information Sets
In this section, I study the high-skill firm’s equilibrium information sets. I make
some observations before proceeding. The low-skill firm always prefers implementing
a project rather than losing it due to a rejected referral. This has the following
implications. First, in an equilibrium, no referral is rejected. Also, the low-skill firm
who refers a project at price p obtains an equilibrium payoff p. Finally, the high-
skill firm accepts referrals at equilibrium prices and rejects referrals at off-equilibrium
prices.
A no-referral equilibrium always exists. In it, the high-skill firm rejects any price
offer because the firm believes that the referred project’s potential is too low to justify
the price. In the rest of the section, I focus on equilibria in which the low-skill firm
successfully refers projects to the high-skill firm. I call them referral equilibria. To
facilitate the analysis, define the high-skill firm’s equilibrium information set to be a
referral set.
Definition 1 (Referral Set) A referral set R(p) is the set of projects which the
low-skill firm refers at equilibrium price p.
In an equilibrium, the low-skill firm may refer different projects at different prices,
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so there may be many referral sets. Any two referral sets must be disjoint because I
concentrate on pure strategy equilibria. In an equilibrium, the high-skill firm infers
that a project at price p comes from the referral set R(p). Whether or not the
high-skill firm inspects the project depends on the precision of the project potential
information conveyed by the low-skill firm’s strategy through the referral price. If
the information conveyed by the referral price is too precise, the high-skill firm does
not inspect the referred project. However, the low-skill firm may exploit a lack of
inspection by referring lemons to the high-skill firm.
There may be many prices that are never offered by the low-skill firm. For ex-
ample, in an equilibrium, the low-skill firm may refer all projects at price p1. Perfect
Bayesian equilibrium does not impose a restriction on the high-skill firm’s belief when
the firm observes prices different from p1. Multiple equilibrium allocations can be
supported by various off-equilibrium beliefs. In this section, I examine all possible
equilibrium allocations by using the following belief restriction.
Definition 2 (Pessimistic Belief) An equilibrium is said to satisfy pessimistic
belief if the high-skill firm believes that a referred project at any off-equilibrium price
has the lowest potential.
Consider an equilibrium and its allocation. The equilibrium may not satisfy pes-
simistic belief, but if I replace the corresponding off-equilibrium belief by pessimistic
belief, then the said allocation remains to be an equilibrium allocation.10 The reason
is that the high-skill firm rejects any off-equilibrium price with pessimistic belief. In
10Although I concentrate on referral equilibria in this section, I can easily construct a no-referral
equilibrium using pessimistic belief.
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this section, I only consider equilibria satisfying pessimistic belief, which is without
loss of generality. In the next section, I introduce another belief restriction as a
refinement.
Lemma 3 Let p be an equilibrium price and R(p) be the corresponding referral set.
For any q ∈ R(p), Sl(q) ≤ p.
Here is the proof. The low-skill firm can always implement a project with potential
q to get its efficient surplus Sl(q), because the firm knows the project potential.
Therefore, in an equilibrium, the low-skill firm refers project q at price p only if the
price is larger than its efficient surplus Sl(q).
Lemma 4 Let ul(q) be an equilibrium payoff of the low-skill firm with project q.
Then ul(q) is a non-decreasing function of q.
Lemma 4 says that the low-skill firm’s equilibrium payoff is non-decreasing in
project potential (proof in the Appendix). This monotonicity is driven by two factors.
First, the low-skill firm always has the option of working on its project to get efficient
surplus Sl(q), which is an increasing function of project potential q. Second, consider
an equilibrium. If the high-skill firm’s equilibrium strategy calls for it to accept a
project q′ at a price p, then the equilibrium strategy also calls for it to accept a
project q′′ > q′. This is true whether or not the high-skill firm inspects the referred
project. In an equilibrium, this guarantees that the low-skill firm’s payoff of referring
a project at a price p is non-decreasing in project potential. Two implications follow
from Lemma 4. The first is a monotone property; if the low-skill firm refers projects
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q1 and q2 at prices p1 and p2 in an equilibrium, respectively, then q1 < q2 implies
p1 < p2. The second implication is stated in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1 An equilibrium referral set is convex.
Here is the proof. Consider an equilibrium in which the low-skill firm refers two
projects q′ and q′′ at a price p, with q′ < q′′. The firm’s equilibrium payoff with
projects q′ or q′′ is p. By Lemma 4, the low-skill firm’s equilibrium payoff with any
project q satisfying q′ < q < q′′ is p as well. Hence, project q belongs to projects
q′ and q′′’s referral set. Corollary 1 implies that a referral set must be of the form
R(p) = (qa, qb), where qa is the infimum of the set, qb is the supremum of the set, and
p is the corresponding equilibrium price. Note that qa and qb are functions of price
p. For convenience, I write a referral set as an open interval.11
Lemma 5 If the high-skill firm accepts an equilibrium referral price p without in-
spection, then inf R(p) = 0.
Lemma 5 is due to standard adverse selection as in Akerlof (1970). The proof
is in the Appendix. If the high-skill firm accepts a price p without inspection, then
the low-skill firm is free to refer any project at price p, including the project with
the lowest potential. Lemma 5 implies that there is at most one equilibrium price
at which the high-skill firm accepts without inspection. If there existed two such
equilibrium prices, the low-skill firm would never refer at the lower price. Moreover,
the equilibrium price at which the high-skill firm accepts without inspection must be
11Whether I write a referral set as an open or a closed set is insignificant because each point of a
set has zero measure.
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the lowest equilibrium price. To see that, suppose there exist multiple equilibrium
prices and the high-skill firm accepts p without inspection. Compared to other referral
sets, R(p) contains projects with the lowest potentials because of Lemma 5 and the
fact that referral sets are disjoint and convex. By Lemma 4, the low-skill firm’s
equilibrium payoff is non-decreasing in project potential. Therefore, p must be the
lowest equilibrium price.
1.3.3 The High-skill Firm’s Equilibrium Strategies and Beliefs
Let p be an equilibrium price and R(p) = (qa, qb) be the corresponding referral set. Let
q˜ be the project potential satisfying Sh(q˜) = p. Recall that in an equilibrium referral
is never rejected, so price p must be lower than the high-skill firm’s efficient surplus
of some projects within the referral set. That is, p < Sh(q
b) and q˜ < qb. At price p,
the high-skill firm believes that the project comes from the interval (qa, qb), hence its
belief density is µ(p, q) = g(q)
G(qb)−G(qa) for q ∈ (qa, qb) and µ(p, q) = 0 otherwise.
In a continuation equilibrium in stage 2, does the high-skill firm inspect a referred
project at price p? Inspection benefits the high-skill firm in two aspects. First, the
high-skill firm has the option to reject a lemon after inspection. If qa < q˜, then the
high-skill firm rejects any project with potential q < q˜ after inspection, because its
efficient surplus of such project is lower than p. Alternatively, if q˜ ≤ qa, then the
high-skill firm accepts each project with potential q ∈ (qa, qb) after inspection because
its efficient surplus of such project is higher than p. The second benefit of inspection
is that, if the high-skill firm accepts the referral after inspection, then it pays the low-
skill firm and may optimally implement a project q with its efficient effort according
to the project potential, which gives the high-skill firm a payoff of Sh(q)− p. By the
above argument, the high-skill firm’s expected surplus of inspecting a referred project
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at price p is
1
G(qb)−G(qa)
qb∫
max{qa,q˜}
[
Sh(q)− p
]
dG(q)− c. (1.2)
If the high-skill firm does not inspect the referred project, then it has two options.
First, the high-skill firm can reject the referral and obtain a payoff of zero. Alterna-
tively, the high-skill firm can accept the project and implement it only knowing that
the referred project is from the set (qa, qb). In the latter case, the high-skill firm pays
the low-skill firm and exerts an average effort. The high-skill firm’s expected surplus
of not inspecting the referred project at price p is
max
{
0,max
e
1
G(qb)−G(qa)
qb∫
qa
[
yh(e, q)− fh − p
]
dG(q)
}
. (1.3)
To sum up, in a continuation equilibrium in stage 2, the high-skill firm inspects a
referred project if and only if the expected surplus of inspecting (1.2) is larger than
the expected surplus of not inspecting (1.3);
1
G(qb)−G(qa)
qb∫
max{qa,q˜}
[
Sh(q)− p
]
dG(q)− c
≥ max
{
0,max
e
1
G(qb)−G(qa)
qb∫
qa
[
yh(e, q)− fh − p
]
dG(q)
}
. (1.4)
Recall that S−1h (x) is the inverse function of Sh(q) such that S
−1
h (Sh(q)) = q. Using
23
the inverse function, q˜ = S−1h (p). Use it to rearrange (1.4) to get
1
G(qb)−G(qa)
qb∫
max{qa,S−1h (p)}
[
Sh(q)− p
]
dG(q)
−max
{
0,max
e
1
G(qb)−G(qa)
qb∫
qa
[
yh(e, q)− fh − p
]
dG(q)
}
≥ c. (1.5)
Define I(qa, qb, p) to be the left-hand side of (1.5). I call I(qa, qb, p) the high-skill
firm’s incremental inspection surplus of the referral set R(p) = (qa, qb). I also define
(1.5) to be the incremental inspection constraint of the referral set R(p) = (qa, qb).
Now we have understood the tradeoff involved behind the high-skill firm’s inspection
decision, I proceed to the first significant result (proof in the Appendix).
Lemma 6 In a referral equilibrium, the high-skill firm always inspects and always
accepts a referred project.
We already know that no referral is rejected in an equilibrium. Moreover, a
referral cannot be sustained without the high-skill firm’s inspection. The argument
is by contradiction. First, by Lemma 5, if a referral was accepted by the high-skill
firm without inspection, then the corresponding referral set would be a convex set
including the project with the lowest potential. Furthermore, if the said referral set
included only projects with potentials lower than qfb, then there would be no scope
for referral because the low-skill firm is more efficient, which would be a contradiction.
However, if the said referral set included projects with potentials larger than qfb, then
the referral set would be quite large. By Assumption A, the high-skill firm’s optimal
response would be to inspect, which created a contradiction.
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Lemma 6 says that the high-skill firm’s inspection is needed to support an equilib-
rium. As explained above, the high-skill firm’s incremental inspection surplus stems
from two channels: (i) the option to reject a lemon, and (ii) the incentive to imple-
ment an accepted project with the efficient effort. The low-skill firm does not refer
a lemon if it anticipates the high-skill firm to inspect and reject the lemon, so in
an equilibrium the high-skill firm’s inspection incentive stems only from the second
channel. Each referral set must be large enough and satisfies the incremental inspec-
tion constraint so that the high-skill firm inspects upon receiving the corresponding
equilibrium price. Clearly, in an equilibrium, the low-skill firm implements projects
with its efficient effort because its information is exogenously given. Lemma 6 im-
plies that the high-skill firm also implements projects with its efficient effort because
it accepts a referral only after inspection.
1.3.4 Equilibrium Characterization
In this section, I provide the necessary and sufficient conditions of an equilibrium.
By Lemma 6, each referral set satisfies the incremental inspection constraint, so each
set cannot be too small. Therefore, an equilibrium consists of a list of n ≥ 1 referral
sets, each denoted by R(pm) = (q
a
m, q
b
m), for m = 1, ..., n. If n ≥ 2, then by Lemma 4
the equilibrium prices, the infimum and the supremum of referral sets can be ranked
so that p1 < p2 < ... < pn, and q
a
1 < q
b
1 ≤ qa2 < qb2 ≤ ... ≤ qan < qbn. Proposition 1’s
(i)-(iv) are necessary conditions of an equilibrium (proof in the Appendix).
Proposition 1 A referral equilibrium consists of n ≥ 1 referral sets, with qa1 <
qb1 ≤ qa2 < qb2 ≤ ... ≤ qan < qbn. For m = 1, ..., n, the low-skill firm refers projects
q ∈ (qam, qbm) at price pm and implements q /∈ (qam, qbm) with effort eˆl(q). The high-skill
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firm inspects, accepts, and implements each referred project q at pm with eˆh(q). At
pm, the high-skill firm’s belief density is µ(p, q) =
g(q)
G(qbm)−G(qam) for q ∈ (q
a, qb) and
µ(p, q) = 0 otherwise. At an off-equilibrium price, the high-skill firm updates with
pessimistic belief and rejects without inspection. The referral equilibrium exists only
if the referral sets satisfy the following conditions.
(i) I(qam, qbm, pm) ≥ c and pm = Sh(qam) ≥ Sl(qbm), for m = 1, ..., n;
(ii) qa1 > q
fb;
(iii) if there exists q such that qbn < q < q¯, then pn = Sh(q
a
n) = Sl(q
b
n); and
(iv) if n ≥ 2 and there exists q such that qbj−1 < q < qaj , then pj−1 = Sh(qaj−1) =
Sl(q
b
j−1), for j = 2, ..., n.
The first part of condition (i) follows from Lemma 6. The high-skill firm accepts
a referral only after inspection, and the high-skill firm inspects upon receiving pm if
and only if I(qam, qbm, pm) ≥ c. The second part of condition (i) can be explained as
follow. First, by Lemma 3, the low-skill firm refers a project q ∈ (qam, qbm) at price pm
only if the price is larger than its efficient surplus; pm ≥ Sl(q). Second, the high-skill
firm accepts q ∈ (qam, qbm) at price pm after inspection if and only if it can generate a
surplus higher than the price, which means that pm ≤ Sh(q). They impose an upper
bound and lower bound for the equilibrium price;
Sh(q
a
m) ≥ pm ≥ Sl(qbm). (1.6)
Indeed, the equilibrium price pm is equal to the upper bound Sh(q
a
m), which is the
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high-skill firm’s efficient surplus at the infimum of the referral set (qam, q
b
m);
pm = Sh(q
a
m) ≥ Sl(qbm). (1.7)
The argument is by contradiction. If the price was lower than the lower bound, which
means that pm < Sh(q
a
m), then there would exist a profitable deviation opportunity
for the low-skill firm. By Lemma 4, the low-skill firm who had a project with a
slightly lower potential than qam would get an equilibrium payoff lower than price pm.
However, as shown in the proof, the low-skill firm with such a project would find
it profitable to deviate and refer it at price pm, because the high-skill firm would
inspect, find out that Sh(q
a
m)− pm > 0, and accept the project.
I call (1.7) the production efficiency constraint of the referral set R(pm), which I
illustrate in Figure 1.2. Recall that S−1l (x) is the inverse function of Sl(q) such that
if Sh(q
a
m) = Sl(q), then S
−1
l (Sh(q
a
m)) = q. In Figure 1.2, for a project with potential
higher than S−1l (Sh(q
a
m)), the low-skill firm obtains a higher surplus by implementing
it rather than referring it at price pm = Sh(q
a
m). Therefore, the production efficiency
constraint says that the supremum of the referral set, qbm, cannot be higher than
S−1l (Sh(q
a
m)). Moreover, if q
a
m increases, S
−1
l (Sh(q
a
m)) also increases, and S
−1
l (Sh(q
a
m))
increases at a faster rate than qam. The production efficiency constraint is less strict
for high-potential projects.
A referral set must satisfy both the incremental inspection constraint (1.5) and
the production efficiency constraint (1.7), but they act in opposite directions. On
the one hand, if a referral set is too small, the high-skill firm does not inspect at the
corresponding price because the incremental inspection surplus is too small to justify
the inspection cost. On the other hand, if a referral set is too large, the low-skill firm
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Figure 1·2: Production efficiency constraint
does not refer some projects inside the set because it can obtain a higher surplus by
implementing them.
Upon receiving a referred project at price pm = Sh(q
a
m), the high-skill firm correctly
infers that the project is from the set (qam, q
b
m). The price is equal to the high-
skill firm’s efficient surplus at the infimum of the set. Therefore, the high-skill firm
can derive an ex-post positive surplus by accepting the referral without inspection.
However, the high-skill firm still inspects in order to exert a surplus-maximizing effort
for implementation, but it has positive unintended consequence. The inspection deters
the low-skill firm from referring lemons and prevents the market from unraveling.
The two constraints imply the second condition (ii) of Proposition 1; qa1 > q
fb,
which means that the low-skill firm refers a lower amount of projects compared to
the first-best allocation. The incremental inspection constraint implies that a referral
set (qam, q
b
m) has a positive measure, whereas the production efficiency constraint says
28
that the referral price for any project within the set must be the high-skill firm’s
efficient surplus at the infimum of the set, pm = Sh(q
a
m). By pooling a set of projects
at a price, the low-skill firm leaves rent to the high-skill firm. Referral is costly for
the low-skill firm, so it prefers retaining and implementing a project with potential
slightly higher than the first best threshold qfb rather than referring it and leaving
rent to the high-skill firm.
To understand the third condition (iii) of Proposition 1, consider an equilibrium
like the one in Figure 1.3. There is only one referral set, R(p1) = (q
a
1 , q
b
1), and there is
a subset of un-referred projects with a positive measure in between the referral set and
the project with the highest potential. That is, there exists q satisfying qb1 < q < q¯.
In the equilibrium, the low-skill firm implements projects within (qb1, q¯) only if its
implementation payoff is higher than the equilibrium price p1. As shown in the proof,
this means that p1 = Sl(q
b
1). The production efficiency constraint of the referral set
(qa1 , q
b
1) becomes p1 = Sh(q
a
1) = Sl(q
b
1).
0
|
qfb
|
qa1
|
R(p1)
qb1
|
q¯
|
Figure 1·3: Third condition (iii) of Proposition 1
The fourth condition (iv) is similar to the third condition (iii). Figure 1.4 shows
an example. There is a subset of un-referred projects with a positive measure in
between two referral sets, R(p1) and R(p2). The subset is (q
b
1, q
a
2). In an equilibrium,
the low-skill firm prefers implementing projects within (qb1, q
a
2) rather than referring
them at p1 only if p1 = Sl(q
b
1).
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Figure 1·4: Fourth condition (iv) of Proposition 1
Proposition 2 shows that the above necessary conditions are also sufficient for the
existence of a referral equilibrium (proof in the Appendix).
Proposition 2 Suppose project potentials qa1 < q
b
1 ≤ qa2 < qb2 ≤ ... ≤ qan < qbn
and prices p1 < p2 < ... < pn satisfy conditions (i) - (iv) in Proposition 1, then
there exists a referral equilibrium in which, for m = 1, ..., n, the low-skill firm refers
projects q ∈ (qam, qbm) at price pm and implements q /∈ (qam, qbm) with effort eˆl(q). Also,
the high-skill firm inspects, accepts, and implements each referred project q at pm with
eˆh(q). At pm, the high-skill firm’s belief density is µ(p, q) =
g(q)
G(qbm)−G(qam) for q ∈ (q
a, qb)
and µ(p, q) = 0 otherwise. At an off-equilibrium price, the high-skill firm updates with
pessimistic belief and rejects without inspection.
By Proposition 1 and 2, a referral equilibrium is fully characterized by a list of
referral sets, with each set satisfying conditions (i)-(iv) in Proposition 1. Given the
fixed costs, return functions and project potentials’ distribution, inspection cost c’s
size determines the existence of referral equilibria. Indeed, Corollary 2 says that a
referral equilibrium exists if and only if the inspection cost is small (proof in the
Appendix).
Corollary 2 Given the fixed costs, return functions and project potentials’ distribu-
tion, there is an inspection cost level cR satisfying 0 < cR ≤ cA such that there exists
a referral equilibrium if and only if c ≤ cR.
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The level cR is the highest inspection cost level at which a list of referral sets can
be compiled to satisfy conditions (i)-(iv) in Proposition 1. If a referral equilibrium
exists at a certain level of inspection cost, then the said equilibrium also exists at
a lower level of inspection cost. The reason is that a lower inspection cost relaxes
the incremental inspection constraint in condition (i) of Proposition 1 but does not
matter in the production efficiency constraint and conditions (ii)-(iv). The exact
exposition of cR is provided in the Appendix. However, Corollary 2 can be further
explained by an example in which project potential is uniformly distributed and the
return functions are quadratic.
Example Let q be uniformly distributed on [0, q¯], and yl(e, q) = eq − 12e2 and
yh(e, q) = req − 12e2, with r > 1, for q ∈ (0, q¯].
In this specification, Sl(q) =
1
2
q2 and Sh(q) =
1
2
r2q2 − fh. Consider a referral set
R(p) = (qa, qb) that satisfies the production efficiency constraint. The incremental
inspection surplus of this set is
I(qa, qb, Sh(qa)) = q¯
qb − qa
1
q¯
[ qb∫
qa
1
2
r2q2 dq −max
e
qb∫
qa
(req − 1
2
e2) dq
]
=
r2
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(qb − qa)2.
The uniform-quadratic structure implies that the incremental inspection surplus of
a referral set is an increasing function of the size of the set. The referral set with
the highest incremental inspection surplus is simply the one with the largest size.
However, the size of a referral set is limited by its production efficiency constraint.
The production efficiency constraint p = Sh(q
a) ≥ Sl(qb) implies that the infimum of
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the referral set qa must be larger than S−1h (Sl(q
b)). In other words, qb − S−1h (Sl(qb))
is the largest size of a referral set with qb being the supremum of the set. By Figure
1.2, qb−S−1h (Sl(qb)) is an increasing function of qb. Therefore, the largest equilibrium
referral set is
(
S−1h (Sl(q¯)), q¯
)
, when qb = q¯. Under an uniform-quadratic structure,
cR = min
{
cA, I
(
S−1h (Sl(q¯)), q¯, Sl(q¯)
)}
= min
{
cA,
r2
24
(
q¯−S−1h (Sl(q¯))
)2}
. If inspection
cost is larger than the second term in the minimization bracket, then there does
not exist a referral set satisfying its production efficiency constraint while having an
incremental inspection surplus larger than the inspection cost. In the main model,
given the generality of the assumption I make on the return functions and project
potentials’ distribution, the incremental inspection constraint of a referral set may not
be a function of the size of the set and cR may be larger than I
(
S−1h (Sl(q¯)), q¯, Sl(q¯)
)
.
I revisit this example in Section 1.5.
1.3.5 Discussion
I end this section by discussing an alternative extensive form of the game and the
relaxation of Assumption A. First, in the current extensive form, the game ends if the
high-skill firm rejects a referral. As I mentioned above, one can consider an alternative
game in which the low-skill firm must implement a rejected project with a small
delay cost  > 0.12 Consider a corresponding equilibrium described in Proposition
1 for this alternative game; the low-skill firm refers projects inside referral sets and
implements projects outside the sets in stage 1. The high-skill firm inspects and
accepts all referred projects in stage 2. Would the low-skill firm deviate now that it
can implement a rejected project with a delay cost? The answer is no. The reason is
that, in the equilibrium, the low-skill firm prefers referring projects inside referral sets
12Professional service industries are deadline-driven. Thus, it is costly to implement projects in a
delayed time.
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rather than implementing them in stage 1. And it prefers implementing projects in
stage 1 rather than implementing them after being rejected with a delay cost. There
is no profitable deviation for the low-skill firm with projects inside or outside referral
sets. Therefore, the analysis of the alternative game is the same as the above.
Finally, consider the relaxation of Assumption A. Recall that in an equilibrium,
the high-skill firm accepts referrals only after inspection. Without Assumption A,
there may or may not exist an equilibrium referral price at which the high-skill firm
accepts without inspection.13 However, Lemma 4 and 5 still apply and have the
following implications as discussed after Lemma 5. There is at most one equilibrium
price at which the high-skill firm accepts without inspection. Also, if such price exists,
then it must be the lowest equilibrium referral price. Relaxing Assumption A may
only affect the first referral set.
1.4 Descending Referral
In this section, I analyze a descending referral game in which the high-skill firm has
an opportunity to refer a project to the low-skill firm. I get descending referral’s
extensive form by interchanging the roles of the low-skill firm and the high-skill firm
in ascending referral’s. Firms’ strategies are defined similarly. I consider referral
prices in between zero and Sh(q¯). However, unlike ascending referral, I allow the
high-skill firm to offer prices equal to zero because the high-skill firm may generate
13Here is another condition under which Lemma 6 holds; Sl(qˆ) > maxe
1
G(qˆ)
∫ qˆ
0
[
yh(e, q)−fh
]
dG(q),
for all qˆ > qfb. Lemma 6 under this condition can be proven by contradiction. Suppose not. Suppose
that in an equilibrium the high-skill firm accepts a project from referral set (0, q′) at p, with q′ > qfb,
without inspection. Price p must be capped by the high-skill firm’s surplus implementing the project,
which is on the R.H.S. of the above inequality by letting qˆ = q′. Also, the price must be higher than
the low-skill firm’s surplus Sl(q) for any q ∈ (0, q′). Together it is a contradiction to the proposed
condition.
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surplus lower than zero for some low-potential projects. The low-skill firm’s belief
about a project q is a density function µl : [0, Sh(q¯)] × Q → R+, and µl(p, q) is the
probability density that the low-skill firm assigns to project q when the referral price
is p, with
∫
Q
µl(p, x)dx = 1. Clearly, pessimistic belief can be extended to descending
referral easily by interchanging firms’ roles in Definition 2. As in ascending referral,
I focus on equilibria under pessimistic belief.
In descending referral, there is always some referrals in any equilibrium. The rea-
son is that the high-skill firm generates a negative surplus for a project with potential
q ≤ q∗, with Sh(q∗) = 0 (see Lemma 2). The high-skill firm would rather refer these
projects at price 0 because the low-skill firm accepts a referral at price 0 regardless of
its belief. Therefore, projects q ≤ q∗ are referred in any equilibrium. By contrast, a
no-referral equilibrium always exists in ascending referral. Despite the above, Lemma
3-5 and Corollary 1 follow directly in descending referral by interchanging the roles
of firms. Call the analogous results Lemma 3∗, Lemma 4∗, Lemma 5∗, and Corollary
1∗. Let p be an equilibrium price and R(p) = (qa, qb) be the corresponding referral
set. In a continuation equilibrium in stage 2, the low-skill firm inspects a referred
project at price p if and only if the incremental inspection constraint is larger than the
inspection cost. Define the low-skill firm’s incremental inspection surplus Il(qa, qb, p)
by interchanging firms’ roles on the right-hand side of (1.5);
Il(qa, qb, p) ≡ 1
G(qb)−G(qa)
qb∫
max{qa,S−1l (p)}
[
Sl(q)− p
]
dG(q)
−max
{
0,max
e
1
G(qb)−G(qa)
qb∫
qa
[
yl(e, q)− p
]
dG(q)
}
.
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An analogous version of Lemma 6 does not exist in descending referral. In an
equilibrium of descending referral, the low-skill firm may or may not inspect before
accepting a referral. Indeed, there are two types of equilibrium. The first type is
similar to a referral equilibrium I analyzed above in ascending referral; the low-skill
firm accepts a referral only after it inspects. Analogous versions of Proposition 1 and
2 exist for the first type of equilibrium, with two minor differences. First, as noted
above, all projects with potential q ≤ q∗ are referred. Second, the supremum of the
last referral set qbn is smaller than the first best threshold q
fb, which still means that
not enough referrals are conducted compared to the first best. I call this an inspection
equilibrium.
In the rest of the section, I focus on the second type of equilibrium, where the
low-skill firm accepts some referrals without inspection. Following the logic of Lemma
5’s discussion, there is at most one equilibrium price at which the referred firm, the
low-skill firm, accepts without inspection. Also, such a price must be the lowest
equilibrium price. the low-skill firm accepts all other equilibrium prices only after
inspection. I call this a minimum-price-no-inspection equilibrium. Proposition 3
provides the necessary conditions for it.
Proposition 3 A minimum-price-no-inspection equilibrium of descending referral
consists of n ≥ 1 referral sets, with qa1 < qb1 ≤ qa2 < qb2 ≤ ... ≤ qan < qbn. For
m = 1, ..., n, the high-skill firm refers projects q ∈ (qam, qbm) at price pm and implements
q /∈ (qam, qbm) with effort eˆh(q). The low-skill firm accepts and implements each project
at p1 with effort argmaxe
1
G(qb1)
∫ qb1
0
yl(e, q) dG(q) without inspection. If n ≥ 2, then
the low-skill firm inspects, accepts, and implements each project q at pj with eˆl(q),
for j = 2, ..., n. At pm, the low-skill firm’s belief density is µl(p, q) =
g(q)
G(qbm)−G(qam) for
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q ∈ (qam, qbm) and µl(p, q) = 0 otherwise, for m = 1, ..., n. At an off-equilibrium price,
the low-skill firm updates with pessimistic belief; it accepts without inspection if the
price is zero and rejects without inspection if the price is positive. The minimum-
price-no-inspection equilibrium exists only if the referral sets satisfy the following
conditions.
(i) each project q ∈ (0, q∗) is referred, with Sh(q∗) = 0. This means that qa1 = 0;
(ii) Il(qa1 , qb1, p1) < c;
(iii) p1 satisfies max{0, Sh(qb1)} ≤ p1 ≤ maxe 1G(qb1)
∫ qb1
0
yl(e, q) dG(q);
(iv) if n ≥ 2, then Il(qaj , qbj , pj) ≥ c and pj = Sl(qaj ) ≥ Sh(qbj), for j = 2, ..., n;
(v) qbn < q
fb;
(vi) pn = Sh(q
b
n); and
(vii) if n ≥ 2 and there exists q such that qaj−1 < q < qbj , for j = 2, ..., n, then
pj−1 = Sl(qaj−1) = Sh(q
b
j−1).
Most of the proof is similar to Proposition 1’s. I point out the difference here.
The first condition (i) of Proposition 3 has been explained above. The low-skill firm
accepts the lowest equilibrium price p1 without inspection. Therefore, the second
condition (ii) says that the incremental inspection surplus of the first referral set
must be smaller than the inspection cost. The third condition (iii) is explained below.
First, without inspection, the low-skill firm only knows that a referred project at p1
comes from (0, qb1), so it accepts only if the surplus it can derive is higher than the
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price, which means that 0 ≤ p1 ≤ maxe 1G(qb1)
∫ qb1
0
yl(e, q) dG(q). Second, by Lemma
3∗, Sh(qb1) ≤ p1.
The low-skill firm accepts other equilibrium prices only after inspection. There-
fore, the fourth condition (iv) says that each corresponding referral set satisfies the
incremental inspection constraint and the production efficiency constraint as in Propo-
sition 1. The fifth condition (v) of Proposition 3 says that the high-skill firm refers a
lower amount of projects compared to the first best. The proof is in the Appendix.
Finally, the sixth condition (vi) and the seventh condition (vii) of Proposition 6 are
similar to the third condition (iii) and the fourth condition (iv) of Proposition 1, re-
spectively. Proposition 4 shows that conditions (i)-(vii) are also sufficient. The proof
is similar to Proposition 2’s.
Proposition 4 Suppose project potentials qa1 < q
b
1 ≤ qa2 < qb2 ≤ ... ≤ qan < qbn and
prices p1 < p2 < ... < pn satisfy conditions (i) - (vii) in Proposition 3, then there
exists a minimum-price-no-inspection equilibrium in which, for m = 1, ..., n, the high-
skill firm refers projects q ∈ (qam, qbm) at price pm and implements q /∈ (qam, qbm) with
effort eˆh(q). The low-skill firm accepts and implements each project at p1 with effort
argmaxe
1
G(qb1)
∫ qb1
0
yl(e, q) dG(q) without inspection. If n ≥ 2, then the low-skill firm
inspects, accepts, and implements each project q at pj with eˆl(q), for j = 2, ..., n. At
pm, the low-skill firm’s belief density is µl(p, q) =
g(q)
G(qbm)−G(qam) for q ∈ (q
a
m, q
b
m) and
µl(p, q) = 0 otherwise. At an off-equilibrium price, the low-skill firm updates with
pessimistic belief; it accepts without inspection if the price is zero and rejects without
inspection if the price is positive.
As said above, there are some referrals in each equilibrium for any level of in-
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spection cost. For example, there always exists an equilibrium in which the high-skill
firm refers each project q ≤ q∗ at price zero and implements the others. If the
inspection cost is low such that c < Il(0, q∗, 0), then the low-skill firm accepts refer-
rals at price zero only after inspection. However, if the inspection cost is high such
that c ≥ Il(0, q∗, 0), then the low-skill firm accepts a referral at price zero without
inspection. The former is an inspection equilibrium and the latter is a minimum-
price-no-inspection equilibrium.
1.5 Equilibrium Selection
In this section, I propose a belief restriction to address two issues created by pes-
simistic belief. I return my focus to ascending referral but the belief restriction applies
similarly to descending referral. First, pessimistic belief is extreme. The high-skill
firm believes that projects at off-equilibrium prices come from a subset with zero
measure and have the lowest potential. Given that each equilibrium referral set has a
positive measure, a more natural belief restriction should require each off-equilibrium
information set to have a positive measure as well.
Second, pessimistic belief may lead to a discontinuous allocation. As indicated by
(iii) and (iv) of Proposition 1, there may exist equilibria in which the low-skill firm
switches between implementation and referral multiple times as project potential
increases. Figure 1.3 in section 1.3.4 serves as an example. It illustrates a subset of
un-referred projects with a positive measure, (qb1, q¯), in between the referral set R(p1)
and q¯. For each project within (qb1, q¯), the high-skill firm’s efficient surplus is larger
than the low-skill firm’s. Clearly, there is scope for referral for each project within the
subset (qb1, q¯). Despite the above, under pessimistic belief, the low-skill firm believes
38
that a project at a price p′ > p1 has potential zero, whereas it believes that a project
at price p1 comes from the referral set R(p1). Under a more natural belief restriction,
the high-skill firm should believe that a project at price p′ comes from the subset
(qb1, q¯).
Definition 3 formalizes a belief restriction to address the above issues. It can be
applied to a no-referral equilibrium, which has n = 0 referral set, as well as to a
referral equilibrium, which has n ≥ 1 referral sets (qa1 , qb1), ..., (qan, qan).
Definition 3 (Monotone Belief) In an equilibrium with n ≥ 0 referral sets, the
high-skill firm believes that a project at any off-equilibrium price p′ comes from a
subset K. The belief is said to satisfy monotone belief if K has a positive measure
and meets the following conditions.
(i) If n ≥ 1, p′ > pn, and Sh(q) ≥ Sl(q) for each q ∈ (qbn, q¯), then K = (qbn, q¯).
(ii) If n ≥ 2, pm < p′ < pm+1, and Sh(q) ≥ Sl(q) for each q ∈ (qbm, qam+1), then
K = (qbm, q
a
m+1), for m = 1, ..., n− 1.
(iii) If n ≥ 1, p′ < p1, and Sh(q) ≥ Sl(q) for each q ∈ (0, qa1), then K = (0, qa1).
(iv) If none of (i)-(iii) is applicable, then K is unrestricted.
I call an equilibrium which satisfies monotone belief a monotone equilibrium. In a
no-referral equilibrium, conditions (i)-(iii) in Definition 3 are not applicable. Mono-
tone belief only imposes the high-skill firm to believe that a project at off-equilibrium
prices comes from a subset with a positive measure. In a referral equilibrium, an
off-equilibrium price is either larger than every equilibrium prices, between two equi-
librium prices, or smaller than every equilibrium prices. Depending on the level of
an off-equilibrium price, one of (i)-(iii) in Definition 3 may be applicable. I have
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discussed the first condition (i) above using Figure 3. Figure 4 in section 1.3.4 il-
lustrates the second condition (ii). It shows an equilibrium with two referral sets,
R(p1) = (q
a
1 , q
b
1) and R(p2) = (q
a
2 , q
b
2). There exists a subset of projects with a posi-
tive measure, (qb1, q
a
2), in between the two referral sets. Also, there is scope for referral
for each project within the subset; each q ∈ (qb1, qa2) satisfies Sh(q) > Sl(q). Hence,
under monotone belief, the high-skill firm believes that a project at p′ that is between
p1 and p2 comes from the subset (q
b
1, q
a
2).
The first condition (i) or the second condition (ii) of Definition 3 may be applicable
in an equilibrium, but the third condition (iii) is never applicable, because the low-
skill firm is more efficient than the high-skill firm for any project with potential
smaller than qfb.14 This is true in Figure 1.5, although there is a subset (0, qa1) with
a positive measure in between 0 and R(p1). In this case, the fourth condition (iv)
applies and monotone belief only imposes the low-skill firm to believe that a project
at off-equilibrium prices comes from a subset with a positive measure. Indeed, Figure
1.5 is an example of a monotone equilibrium. Lemma 7 characterizes a monotone
equilibrium (proof in the Appendix).
0
|
qfb
|
qa1
|
R(p2)
qb1 = q
a
2
|
R(p2)
qb2 = q
a
3
|
R(p3)
qb3 = q¯
|
Figure 1·5: A monotone equilibrium
Lemma 7 In a monotone equilibrium consisting of n ≥ 1 referral sets (qa1 , qb1), ...,
(qan, q
a
n), each project with potential q ≥ qa1 is referred.
14In descending referral, monotone belief is defined by interchanging firms’ roles in Definition 3.
Then, (ii)-(iii) of monotone belief can be applicable but the first condition (i) is never applicable.
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In a monotone equilibrium, the low-skill firm switches between implementation
and referral only once as project potential increases. The only difference between a
monotone equilibrium’s allocation and the first-best allocation is that the equilibrium
threshold is larger than the first-best threshold; qa1 > q
fb. The equilibrium in Figure
1.4 is not a monotone equilibrium. To see that, consider an off-equilibrium price
p′ = Sh(qb1), which is in between p1 = Sh(q
a
1) and p2 = Sh(q
a
2). By monotone belief, the
high-skill firm believes that a project at p′ comes from the subset (qb1, q
a
2). Given the
belief, the high-skill firm either best responds by inspecting the project or accepting
the referral without inspection. Given either best responses, the low-skill firm who
has a project with potential equal or just larger than qb1 would find it profitable to
deviate and refer it at price p′ = Sh(qb1), instead of following the equilibrium strategy
by implementing it and obtaining Sl(q). Similarly, the equilibrium in Figure 1.3,
where a subset with a positive measure exists in between the last referral set and q¯,
is not a monotone equilibrium neither.
Lemma 8 In an equilibrium, if (i) there is n ≥ 1 referral sets (qa1 , qb1), ..., (qan, qan)
with each project q ≥ qa1 being referred, or (ii) there is n = 0 referral set, then there
is a monotone equilibrium that shares the same referral sets and allocation with the
said equilibrium.
In the rest of the section, I restrict my attention to monotone equilibria and study
their Pareto efficiency, since it is natural to expect firms to play Pareto-efficient
equilibria. Lemma 8 says that restriction to monotone equilibria does not rule out
a no-referral equilibrium allocation nor any referral equilibrium allocation in which
low-potential projects are assigned to the low-skill firm and high-potential projects
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are assigned to the high-skill firm (proof in the Appendix).
As pointed out by Holmstrom and Myerson (1983), Pareto efficiency can be eval-
uated from an ex-ante, interim, or ex-post point of view. Each vantage point differs
in the extent of how much private information is revealed to agents. In my model,
ex-ante Pareto efficiency is evaluated at the beginning of stage 1, before nature as-
signs a project and reveals the project potential. Interim Pareto efficiency requires
the evaluation of expected payoff conditional on the project potential information
that has been revealed to the low-skill firm in the middle of stage 1. Pareto efficiency
cannot be evaluated ex-post at the end of stage 2 because the degree of information
revelation in one equilibrium may be different from another. To see that, consider
two equilibria. In the first, a project with potential q is referred to the high-skill
firm, but in the second a project with the same potential q is implemented by the
low-skill firm. Project potential is revealed to the high-skill firm ex-post in the first
equilibrium but not in the second.
Recall that ul(q) denotes the low-skill firm’s equilibrium payoff with project q.
Furthermore, define uh to be the high-skill firm’s expected equilibrium payoff before
a referral offer is made. Consider an equilibrium which has n ≥ 1 referral sets,
R(p1), ..., R(pn), with R(pm) = (q
a
m, q
b
m), for m = 1, ..., n. If q ∈ R(pm), for m =
1, ..., n, then the high-skill firm’s ex-post payoff is Sh(q) − pm − c. Otherwise, its
ex-post payoff is zero. Therefore, the high-skill firm’s expected equilibrium payoff is
uh =
∫ qb1
qa1
[Sh(q)−p1−c] dG(q)+
∫ qb2
qa2
[Sh(q)−p2−c] dG(q)+...+
∫ qbn
qan
[Sh(q)−pn−c] dG(q).
Clearly, uh = 0 for a no-referral equilibrium.
Definition 4 (Pareto Dominance) Consider an equilibrium with equilibrium pay-
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off functions ul(q), q ∈ Q, and uh, and another equilibrium with equilibrium payoff
functions u′l(q), q ∈ Q, and u′h. The former interim Pareto dominates the latter if
ul(q) ≥ u′l(q), for ∀q, and uh ≥ u′h, with at least one strict inequality. Moreover, the
former ex-ante Pareto dominates the latter if
∫
Q
ul(q) dG(q) ≥
∫
Q
u′l(q) dG(q) and
uh ≥ u′h, with at least one strict inequality.
An equilibrium is said to be interim Pareto-efficient if there does not exist an-
other equilibrium that interim Pareto dominates it. A similar definition follows for
an ex-ante Pareto-efficient equilibrium. Proposition 5 provides the necessary and suf-
ficient conditions of an interim Pareto-efficient monotone equilibrium (proof in the
Appendix). By definition, these are also necessary conditions for an ex-ante Pareto-
efficient monotone equilibrium. Recall that S−1h (x) is the inverse function of Sh(q)
such that if Sl(q
a
1) ≤ Sh(q), then S−1h (Sl(qa1)) ≤ q.
Proposition 5 First, a monotone equilibrium with n ≥ 1 referral sets is interim
Pareto efficient if and only if I(q, qa1 , Sh(q)) < c for each q satisfying S−1h (Sl(qa1)) ≤
q ≤ qa1 . Second, a monotone equilibrium with zero referral sets is interim Pareto
efficient if and only if I(q, q¯, Sh(q)) < c for each q satisfying S−1h (Sl(q¯)) ≤ q ≤ q¯.
Here I show that the above condition is necessary for an interim Pareto efficient
monotone equilibrium with n ≥ 1 referral set. Suppose not. Suppose that there
are n ≥ 1 referral sets (qa1 , qb1), (qa2 , qb2), ..., (qan, qan) in an interim Pareto efficient mono-
tone equilibrium and there exists a project q′ satisfying S−1h
(
Sl(q
a
1)
) ≤ q ≤ qa1 and
c ≤ I(q′, qa1 , Sh(q′)). Call this equilibrium σ. First, by Proposition 2, I can construct
another equilibrium σ′ with n+ 1 referral sets (q′, qa1), (q
a
1 , q
b
1), (q
a
2 , q
b
2), ..., (q
a
n, q
a
n), be-
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cause the first referral set (q′, qa1) satisfies its incremental inspection constraint and
production efficiency constraint by the above assumption S−1h
(
Sl(q
a
1)
) ≤ q ≤ qa1 and
c ≤ I(q′, qa1 , Sh(q′)), and the last n sets are the same as σ’s referral sets and must
satisfy the corresponding two constraints. In σ′, all q ≥ q′ are referred, so Lemma
8 ensures that σ′ can be constructed as a monotone equilibrium. Clearly, σ′ interim
Pareto dominates σ, which is a contradiction. The proof in the Appendix shows
that this necessary condition is also sufficient. Proposition 5 extends naturally to a
monotone equilibrium with n = 0 referral set with a similar proof.
For a given monotone equilibrium to be interim Pareto efficient, Proposition 5 says
that the inspection cost must not be too small, otherwise it is interim Pareto dom-
inated by another monotone equilibrium which has a larger set of referred projects.
Proposition 5 provides insight on the range of projects being referred in an interim
Pareto monotone equilibrium. It characterizes the referral threshold qa1 ; one should
not be able to construct a referral set that satisfies both the production efficiency con-
straint and the incremental inspection using qa1 as the supremum of the set. Again, I
use the quadratic-uniform model as an example to further explain Proposition 5.
Example (continued) Suppose that the model is quadratic-uniform. Also, suppose
that c < cR so there exists a unique q
′ < q¯ such that I(S−1h (Sl(q′)), q′, Sl(q′)) = c.
Then, in an interim Pareto efficient monotone equilibrium all q ≥ q′ are referred and
qa1 satisfies S
−1
h (Sl(q
′)) ≤ qa1 < q′.
By Lemma 8, in an interim Pareto efficient monotone equilibrium, all q ≥ qa1 are
referred. So I only have to prove that S−1h (Sl(q
′)) ≤ qa1 < q′. As shown in Section
1.3,
(
S−1h (Sl(q)), q
)
is the largest referral set with q being the supremum of the set.
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And I(S−1h (Sl(q)), q, Sl(q)) = r224(q − S−1h (Sl(q)))2 is the corresponding incremental
inspection surplus. Since I(S−1h (Sl(q)), q, Sl(q)) is an increasing function in q and
I(S−1h (Sl(q′)), q′, Sl(q′)) = c, in an equilibrium q′ is the smallest supremum of a
referral set. Therefore, in an equilibrium, qb1 ≥ q′. By Proposition 1, Sh(qa1) ≥ Sl(qb1),
which means that qa1 ≥ S−1h (Sl(qb1)) ≥ S−1h (Sl(q′)). To complete the proof I have to
show that qa1 < q
′. Suppose not. Suppose that in an interim Pareto efficient monotone
equilibrium qa1 ≥ q′. It follows that
I(S−1h (Sl(qa1)), qa1 , Sl(qa1)) ≥ I(S−1h (Sl(q′)), q′, Sl(q′)) = c,
which is a contradiction to Proposition 5.
By putting more structure into the model, I pin down the range of qa1 and the
range of projects that are referred in an interim Pareto efficient monotone equilibrium.
However, the number and the size of referral sets in different interim Pareto efficient
monotone equilibrium still vary.
1.6 Extensions
In this section, I discuss two extensions of ascending referral. They apply to descend-
ing referral as well. First, I allow the high-skill firm’s inspection to be contractible.
Second, I endogenize the low-skill firm’s inspection decision. I construct equilibria
with pessimistic belief throughout the section.
1.6.1 Contractible Inspection
In this section, I change the assumption that inspection is a hidden action and let
inspection be contractible. The low-skill firm may now conduct a referral using a
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two-dimensional contract (p, r) in stage 1, where p ∈ (0, Sh(q¯)] denotes the referral
price and r ∈ [0, c] denotes the payment from the low-skill firm to the high-skill firm
if and only if the high-skill firm has done the inspection. The rest of the extensive
form remains unchanged. If the low-skill firm offers a contract with 0 ≤ r < c,
then the high-skill firm’s effective inspection cost becomes c− r. If the low-skill firm
offers a contract with r = c, then the high-skill firm inspects the project regardless
of its belief. In a referral equilibrium of the main model, there must be a referral
set (qa, qb) satisfying the incremental inspection constraint. The low-skill firm pools
projects within (qa, qb) at p = Sh(q
a) and the high-skill firm accepts after inspection.
If inspection is contractible, would the low-skill firm pool projects within (qa, qb) at
an equivalent contract with p = Sh(q
a) and r = 0? Lemma 9 provides a negative
answer.
Lemma 9 Suppose inspection is contractible. In an equilibrium, the low-skill firm
refers a project q at a contract (p, r) with p = Sh(q) and r = c.
Here is the proof. First, note that Lemma 3-6 and Corollary 1 still apply. Suppose
not. Suppose that, in an equilibrium, the low-skill firm refers each project q ∈ (qa, qb)
at a contract (p′, r′) with 0 ≤ r′ < c. The high-skill firm accepts each project
q ∈ (qa, qb) at contract (p′, r′) only after inspection, which means that p′ ≤ Sh(qa)
and I(qa, qb, Sh(qa)) ≥ c − r > 0. Using the same logic to prove that the first
condition (i) of Proposition 1 is necessary for a referral equilibrium, I can say that
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p′ = Sh(qa). Also, expand I(qa, qb, Sh(qa)) ≥ c− r > 0 according to (1.5) to get
1
G(qb)−G(qa)
qb∫
qa
[
Sh(q)− (c− r)− Sh(qa)
]
dG(q)
≥ max
e
1
G(qb)−G(qa)
qb∫
qa
[
yh(e, q)− fh − Sh(qa)
]
dG(q) > 0, (1.8)
which implies that
qb∫
qa
{
Sh(q)− c− [Sh(qa)− r]
}
dG(q) > 0. (1.9)
By (1.9) there exists a q′ ∈ (qa, qb) such that Sh(q) − c − [Sh(qa) − r] > 0 for all
q ≥ q′. Therefore, the low-skill firm with a project q ∈ (q′, qb) will deviate from the
contract (p′, r′) to a contract (p, r) with p = Sh(q) and r = c because the deviation
payoff Sh(q)− c is larger than the equilibrium payoff Sh(qa)− r. By fully reimbursing
the high-skill firm’s inspection cost, the low-skill firm may increase the referral price
from Sh(q
a) to Sh(q) and extract all rent from the high-skill firm. Proposition 6
characterizes the unique equilibrium allocation when inspection is contractible.
Proposition 6 Suppose inspection is contractible. A referral equilibrium exists if
and only if c < Sh(q¯)− Sl(q¯). The low-skill firm implements each project q ≤ qc with
effort eˆl(q) and refers q > q
c at a contract (Sh(q), c). The equilibrium threshold q
c is
characterized by Sh(q
c)− c = Sl(qc), which implies that qc > qfb. The high-skill firm
inspects, accepts and implements each referred project q at (Sh(q), c) with eˆh(q). At
an off-equilibrium contract with r = c, the high-skill firm inspects the project. At an
off-equilibrium contract with r < c, the high-skill firm updates with pessimistic belief
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and rejects it.
I provide the proof here. By Lemma 9, in an equilibrium, the low-skill firm with
project q either implements it to get a payoff of Sl(q) or refers it at a contract (Sh(q), c)
to get a payoff of Sh(q)− c. If c < Sh(q¯)−Sl(q¯), then there exists a unique project qc
satisfying Sh(q
c)− c = Sl(qc). Therefore, the low-skill firm refers each project q > qc
at a contract (Sh(q), c) and implements the rest. Finally, in a referral equilibrium,
the low-skill firm refers a project q at (Sh(q), c) only if the referral payoff Sh(q)− c is
larger than its implementation payoff Sl(q), which implies that c < Sh(q¯)− Sl(q¯).
The equilibrium allocation is unique because the high-skill firm inspects a project
whenever its inspection cost is reimbursed, and the inspection eliminates adverse
selection, which allows the low-skill firm to refer all projects with potential larger than
qc regardless of the high-skill firm’s belief. The equilibrium is also separating: each
referred project is associated with a unique contract, and the low-skill firm extracts
all rents from the high-skill firm. The only source of inefficiency of the equilibrium
is that qc > qfb. It is costly for the low-skill firm to reimburse the inspection cost,
so it retains some projects that would have been referred in the first best. As in
an equilibrium of the main model, both the low-skill firm and the high-skill firm
implement projects with their respective efficient efforts.
1.6.2 Endogenous Information for the Low-skill Firm
In the main model, the low-skill firm’s private information about the project is ex-
ogenous. In order to check the robustness of the model, I change the assumption
so that the low-skill firm is uninformed initially. The low-skill firm must incur an
inspection cost c to learn about a project’s potential privately before implementing
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or referring it. Both firms’ inspections are their own hidden actions. I assume firms’
inspection costs to be identical, but this assumption is for simple exposition only.
The rest of the extensive form remains unchanged. In an equilibrium, the low-skill
firm optimally chooses its inspection decision and referral decision given the high-skill
firm’s best response and belief. When the high-skill firm receives the referral price,
it forms beliefs about the project potential as well as the low-skill firm’s inspection
decision. Pessimistic belief is redefined; at any off-equilibrium price, the high-skill
firm believes that the low-skill firm has inspected the project and has referred the
one with the lowest potential. I will construct equilibria with this modified version
of pessimistic belief. Lemma 10 says that the high-skill firm’s equilibrium inspection
must be preceded by the low-skill firm’s if the inspection cost is low enough (proof in
the Appendix).
Lemma 10 Suppose the low-skill firm must incur an inspection cost c to privately
learn a project’s potential. Given the fixed costs, return functions and project poten-
tials’ distribution, there exists a cˆ > 0 such that if c ≤ cˆ, then there is no equilibrium
in which the low-skill firm refers a project without inspection but the high-skill firm
inspects the referred project.
The argument is by contradiction. Consider a referral equilibrium in which the
low-skill firm did not inspect and referred all projects at p to the high-skill firm,
and the high-skill firm inspected at p. The high-skill firm would accept the high-
potential projects with which it could generate a surplus higher than p and would
reject the others. What could the low-skill firm gain if it deviated and inspected
before conducting a referral? First, rather than sending the low-potential projects
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to the high-skill firm and getting rejected, the low-skill firm could implement them.
Second, the low-skill firm could retain and implement the high-potential projects
with which it could generate a higher surplus than p. For the low-skill firm, the
combined information gain would be higher than the inspection cost if the latter was
low enough. Therefore, the high-skill firm’s equilibrium inspection must be preceded
by the low-skill firm’s if inspection cost c is low enough. The exact exposition of cˆ
is provided in the Appendix. I use Lemma 9 to prove Proposition 7 (proof in the
Appendix).
Proposition 7 Suppose the low-skill firm must incur an inspection cost c to pri-
vately learn a project’s potential. Given the fixed costs, return functions and project
potentials’ distribution, there exists a c˜ satisfying 0 ≤ c˜ ≤ cˆ such that if c ≤ c˜, then
in an equilibrium the low-skill firm inspects a project before referring or implementing
it.
Suppose the inspection cost c is low. Clearly, in a no-referral equilibrium, the low-
skill firm inspects a project in order to implement it with the firm’s efficient effort. Is
there a referral equilibrium in which the low-skill firm refers a project to the high-skill
firm without anybody inspecting the project? The answer is negative. If the low-
skill firm refers without inspection, then the high-skill firm inspects in order to reject
lemons and implement accepted projects with its efficient effort. However, by Lemma
9, there is no equilibrium in which the high-skill firm inspects but the low-skill firm
does not. Proposition 7 follows; if inspection cost is low, then in an equilibrium the
low-skill firm inspects a project before it refers or implements the project.
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1.7 Subcontracting and Cost-reduction Effort
In this section, I discuss how my model can be used to understand subcontracting
in the construction industry. In the construction industry, production involves a
contractor completing a project by incurring a construction cost, which can be reduced
by the contractor’s chosen effort. However, the contractor can also subcontract the
project to another contractor.
I make a few modifications to the main model. There is still a set of projects
denoted by q, which has the same support, distribution function, and density function
as before. But q now denotes a project’s difficulty index, which affects a contractor’s
construction cost as shown below. There are two risk-neutral contractors. A low-skill
contractor can complete a project q by incurring a fixed cost fl and a variable cost
kl(e, q), whereas a high-skill contractor can complete a project q by incurring a fixed
cost fh and a variable cost kh(e, q). A completed project yields a fixed return R > 0
regardless of its difficulty q.
Each contractor’s variable cost is a function of project difficulty and the effort
he exerts. Let the variable cost functions be ki : R+ × Q → R+, i = l, h. The
variable cost functions are strictly increasing in project difficulty q; ∂kh(e,q)
∂q
> 0 and
∂kl(e,q)
∂q
> 0. I assume that a contractor needs to choose an effort in order to balance
the marginal benefit and marginal disutility of effort to minimize its variable cost.
The variable cost functions kl(e, q) and kh(e, q) are twice-differentiable and strictly
convex in e. Also, mine kl(e, 0) = mine kh(e, 0) = 0 and kl(0, q) = kh(0, q) = 0 for
∀q ∈ Q. Given a project with positive difficulty q, kl(e, q) and kh(e, q) each achieves
an interior minimum at a positive number at a positive effort e. Finally, the cross
derivatives of the variable cost functions are negative; ∂
2kl(e,q)
∂e∂q
< 0 and ∂
2kh(e,q)
∂e∂q
< 0.
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This implies that ki(e1, q1)−ki(e2, q1) < ki(e1, q2)−ki(e2, q2), for i = l, h, with e1 < e2
and q1 < q2. For each contractor, an increase in effort reduces the variable cost of a
more difficult project to a larger extent. In other words, choosing the right effort is
more important when a contractor works on a more difficult project.15
As in the main model, the two contractors have different comparative advantages.
The high-skill contractor has to incur a higher fixed cost than the low-skill contractor
to complete a project; fh > fl = 0. However, the high-skill contractor’s variable cost is
lower and it is more productive in reducing variable cost. First, given a project q and
an effort e, the high-skill contractor’s variable cost is lower, so that kh(e, q) < kl(e, q).
Second, the high-skill contractor can reduce variable cost more than the low-skill
contractor can by increasing effort; ∂kh(e,q)
∂e
≤ ∂kl(e,q)
∂e
. Third, the high-skill contractor’s
marginal variable cost of project difficulty is lower; ∂kh(e,q)
∂q
< ∂kl(e,q)
∂q
. Finally, I assume
that mine kh(e, q¯) + fh < mine kl(e, q¯) < R. The first inequality makes sure that the
high-skill contractor is more efficient in completing some projects, whereas the second
inequality says that any project should be completed by either contractor.
As we can see above, the modified model’s setup is like a mirror image of the main
model’s. Lemma 11 says that the low-skill contractor completes less difficult projects
and the high-skill contractor completes more difficult projects in the first best. The
modified model’s first best is a mirror image of the main model’s in the sense that
the less productive and less costly contractor is now responsible for projects that
15Despite the similarities, I have not assumed that R − ki(e, q) is equal to yi(e, q), for i = l, h,
which are the return functions in the main model. To see that, suppose firms variable cost functions
dl(e, q) and dh(e, q) were characterized by R−di(e, q) = yi(e, q), for i = l, h. That meant ∂di(e,q)∂q < 0,
for i = l, h; a project with a higher q was easier to complete. However, that also meant ∂
2di(e,q)
∂e∂q < 0,
for i = l, h, which would mean an increase in effort reduces the variable cost of an easier project to
a larger extent and choosing the right effort is more important when a contractor works on an easier
project. This would not be a natural assumption.
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are preferred by both contractors, the less difficult projects. Note that the high-skill
firm’s efficient cost Γh(q) increases slower than the low-skill firm’s efficient cost Γl(q)
as project difficulty increases. The proof’s logic is the same as the ones in Lemma 1
and Lemma 2.
Lemma 11 Let Γl(q) ≡ mine kl(e, q) and Γh(q) ≡ mine kl(e, q) + fh. Then, dΓl(q)dq >
dΓh(q)
dq
> 0 for q ∈ Q. There exists a unique qfb ∈ Q such that Γh(q) > Γl(q) for
q < qfb, Γl(q) < Γh(q) for q > q
fb, and Γh(q
fb) = Γh(q
fb).
Next, I can study a subcontracting game where an informed contractor can either
complete a project himself or subcontract it to another contractor for completion.
The uninformed subcontractor can learn about the project’s difficulty at an inspection
cost before accepting or rejecting the offer. There is only one difference between a
subcontracting game and a referral game. In the subcontracting game, the ownership
of the project cannot be transferred. I assume that the only contractible event is
the completion of a project, so the informed contractor can use a lump-sum payment
to subcontract a project. This assumption is driven by practices in the construction
industries.16 Although the subcontractor does not get the project return R when
it completes the project, it gets paid by a fixed amount and has the full incentive
to reduce cost. Therefore, all the results that I have proved under a referral game
apply to a subcontracting game as well. As I have discussed in the introduction, the
modified model’s setup and results resonate with the practices in the construction
industry.
16Here is an example. A general contractor agrees to build a guest house in a customer’s backyard.
He may subcontract the work to another contractor, but the general contractor is the party who
gets paid by the customer when the house is finished.
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1.8 Conclusion
I have provided a model to study how the market can facilitate matching of projects
with firms for efficient implementation in the presence of hidden action, hidden in-
formation and endogenous inspection. In contrast to previous works on referral, I
point out that both the referring and the referred firms may inspect a project, and
the referred firm’s inspection is needed to support two-way referrals and referrals at
multiple equilibrium prices in an equilibrium. I also point out that inspection benefits
a referred firm in two ways. First, the firm can use the project information to make
referral acceptance decision. Second, the firm can use the information to tailor its
production effort for maximum efficiency. This intuition allows me to solve a model
in a rich environment with a continuum of project types and variable effort. This
leads to partial-pooling equilibria, with prices serving as signals of the corresponding
projects’ potential. In an equilibrium, the referred firm inspects solely to exert the
best effort according to project potential. Such inspection deters lemons and supports
the market. The referral market is more efficient in matching projects with firms than
other authors have suggested. My model can also be used to explain subcontracting
practices in the construction industry.
There are rooms for future work. First, the framework in this chapter can be
studied from a principal-expert perspective. A principal has a project, and he needs
to choose an optimal way to incentivize agents to acquire information and report
truthfully. According to the information, the principal then allocates the project
to one of the two experts. Sometimes, the principal may rely on one expert for
project information acquisition and execution. Other times, the principal may rely
on different experts for the two tasks. It is interesting to study the principal’s tradeoff.
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In my model, the referring firm proposes a take-it-or-leave-it offer. One can model
the bargaining process more explicitly. For example, an informed firm can propose
a price, but an uninformed firm may inspect the project before accepting or making
a counter-offer. It is interesting to see how the uninformed firm’s incentive to exert
surplus-maximizing effort can affect the bargaining process.
Lastly, one may study a more complicated inspection technology with which firms
exert variable effort to acquire imperfect information about a project. In this case,
the first best may require both firms to acquire information. A referring firm and a
referred firm may disagree with each other on the project potential even after they
have both inspected a project. It is interesting to study how firms can aggregate their
information through a referral market.
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Chapter 2
Gatekeeping Mechanism and Information
Acquistion
2.1 Introduction
I consider a mechanism design problem in which a Principal would like to efficiently
assign a project among a low-skill expert and a high-skill expert based on the project’s
difficulty in order to exploit experts’ cost comparative advantages. However, the Prin-
cipal relies on the same group of experts to inform him about the project’s difficulty. I
study the contract and the structure of an optimal mechanism and experts’ incentive
to acquire and report information in the mechanism.
Consider the following example in the healthcare industry. A payer relies on either
a generalist physician or a specialist physician to diagnose a patient. If the patent’s
issue is mild, then the payer would like the generalist to treat the patient. If the issue
is serious, then the payer would like the specialist to provide the service. It is not
cost-efficient for a physician to treat a mismatched patient. The payer contracts with
the physicians by choosing one of the physicians as a gatekeeper. The gatekeeper
is responsible for diagnosing the patient’s condition. Then, based on the diagnosis
report, the gatekeeper decides whether he should treat the patient or refer the patient
to the non-gatekeeper physician. In a typical health maintenance organization (HMO)
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insurance plan, a generalist physician serves as a gatekeeper to oversee the medical
care of patients and make referrals to a specialist physician when necessary.
This environment raises some interesting questions. In the above example, the
generalist is chosen as the gatekeeper. What is the driving force behind the choice?
To understand this issue I adopt a relaxed view to think about a generalist’s and
a specialist’s comparative advantages. Secondly, the payer relies on the same group
of physicians to diagnose a patient, make a report to the payer, and serve the pa-
tient. How should the payer structure an optimal contract in order to incentivize
the gatekeeper to carry out the diagnosis and refer the patient efficiently? Can the
first best be implemented? The above questions are also relevant in other industries,
such as the accounting, financial, and construction industries, where organizations
use gatekeeper to screen incoming projects.
In my model, there is a set of projects; each project has a different difficulty state.
Each of two experts can implement a project by incurring a cost. For each expert, it
is more costly to implement a more difficult project. However, the two experts have
different cost comparative advantages: a low-skill expert has zero fixed cost but a
high marginal cost of difficulty, whereas a high-skill expert has a positive fixed cost
but a low marginal cost of difficulty. In the first best, the low-skill expert should
implement less difficult projects and the high-skill expert should implement more
difficult projects.
The Principal needs to rely on one of the experts to implement a project but he
does not know the project state. In a mechanism, he offers a contract to both experts.
Through the contract, the Principal appoints an expert as a gatekeeper. Moreover,
the contract consists of the Principal’s payments and his probabilities of assigning the
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project to each expert. The payments and the assignment probabilities are functions
of the gatekeeper’s eventual report. After both experts accept the contract, the
gatekeeper may acquire information about the project and make a report to the
Principal, who then pays and assigns the project to the experts based on the report.
Finally, the assigned expert implements the project. The information acquisition
timing is justified by the practices of the healthcare industry. Physicians sign new
contracts determining their payment schemes on a yearly basis. However, patients
register with a healthcare network and they go to see a doctor only when they feel
sick.
Clearly, the Principal can offer a contract with constant payments and constant
project assignment probabilities if he does not intend to assign projects based on the
gatekeeper’s report. In this case, it does not matter which expert is chosen as the
gatekeeper. Such a contract can be optimal if information acquisition cost is very
high. Otherwise, when designing an optimal contract, the Principal must choose the
right expert as a gatekeeper. Also, he must provide incentive for the gatekeeper to
acquire information and make a report truthfully.
I find that it is never optimal for the Principal to choose the high-skill expert
as the gatekeeper even though each expert has his own cost comparative advantage.
To incentivize a high-skill gatekeeper to report truthfully, the Principal has to assign
projects to him with a smaller probability as project difficulty increases. However, this
is costly for the Principal since the high-skill expert is more efficient in implementing
a more difficult project.
Instead, the Principal optimally chooses the low-skill expert as the gatekeeper.
Unlike the above, assigning more difficult projects to the low-skill gatekeeper with a
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smaller probability for truthful reporting purpose is incidentally cost-efficient. Un-
der some conditions, the optimal low-skill gatekeeper mechanism also implements the
first best. That means it is without loss of generality to focus on low-skill gatekeeper
mechanism. Otherwise, a mechanism with low-skill gatekeeper may not implement
the first best if information acquisition cost is large. In this case, the Principal assigns
low-difficulty and high-difficulty projects to the low-skill and high-skill expert, respec-
tively. He assigns medium-difficulty projects to the low-skill expert with a probability
that decreases in difficulty in steps. The Principal uses the step probability assign-
ment function assign projects efficiently while incentivizing the low-skill gatekeeper
to acquire information and report the truth.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2.1 provides a
review of the literature. Section 2.2 presents the model setup and the first best. Sec-
tion 2.3 studies a mechanism without a gatekeeper. Section 2.4 studies a mechanism
with a gatekeeper. Section 2.5 considers a more general cost structure. Section 2.6
concludes. Finally, the Appendix contains proofs of results.
2.1.1 Literature Review
This model provides insight on internal organizations and justifies the use of a low-
skill and low-cost gatekeeper to screen incoming projects. Unlike the extant literature,
my chapter does not assume that experts differ in their discrete ability in completing
a project. In both the health and the management literature, Allard, Jelovac, and
Le´ger (2011), Malcomson (2004), Marin˜oso and Jelovac (2003), Lee, Shumkey, and
Pinker (2012), and Shumsky and Pinker (2003) assume that both a generalist and
a specialist can cure a common disease, but only the specialist can cure a severe
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disease.1 The generalist is assumed to be the gatekeeper, who can privately diagnose
patient and make referral to the specialist. The literature studies various contracts.
In contrast, my chapter assumes that the low-skill expert and the high-skill expert
have different costs comparative advantages but each can implement a project of any
difficulty. Each expert can acquire information and be chosen as the gatekeeper. I
show that this more relaxed assumption on experts’ production function is enough to
justify the usage of the low-skill expert as the gatekeeper. Also, I show that under
some conditions focusing on gatekeeper mechanism is without loss of generality.
This chapter contributes to the literature on information acquisition in principal-
agent problems; see Cre´mer, Khalil, and Rochet (1998), Kra¨hmer and Strausz (2011),
Lewis and Sappington (1997), and Szalay (2009). In these papers, the Principal uses
contracts to incentivize information acquisition and truthful revelation in order to
minimize cost. In Gromb and Martimort (2007), the Principal relies on two identical
experts to gather and report signals about a project’s value, but their focus is on
experts’ collusion. In my chapter, the Principal’s objective to save cost may conflict
with his need to incentivize information acquisition and truthful revelation because
he may assign projects among two agents with different cost comparative advantages
using the information.
Finally, this chapter is related to the referral literature. In Garicano and Santos
(2004), Grassi and Ma (2016), and this chapter, experts have different comparative
advantages in marginal productivities and fixed costs. The papers above show that
referral under adverse selection leads to inefficiency. In contrast, I follow a mechanism
1In Allard, Jelovac, and Le´ger (2011) and Marin˜oso and Jelovac (2003), disease type is binary.
In Malcomson (2004), Lee, Shumkey, and Pinker (2012), and Shumsky and Pinker (2003), disease
type is continuous.
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design approach and show that gatekeeping can be efficient. This justifies a centralized
approach to the matching problem.
2.2 Model
2.2.1 Projects, Experts, and Information Structure
There is a continuum of projects with total mass set at 1. Each project is indexed
by a difficulty state s, which is a random variable distributed on a support S ≡ [0, s¯],
with a continuous distribution function G(·) and a density function g(·). Define the
inverse hazard rate as h ≡ [1−G]/g and the inverse reverse hazard rate as k ≡ G/g.
I assume that h′(s) < 0 and k′(s) > 0, for all s ∈ S. I assume that the Principal must
implement the project regardless of difficulty.2
There are two risk-neutral experts, a low-skill expert and a high-skill expert.
Either expert can implement a project at a cost. An expert’s implementation cost
is a function of the project state. The low-skill expert’s implementation cost is s,
whereas the high-skill expert’s is ch(x) ≡ αs+ β. The low-skill expert’s cost function
is a normalization. In Section 2.3, I consider a more relax cost function for the high-
skill expert. It is more costly for either expert to implement a more difficult project
(project with a higher s). However, I assume that the two experts have different
comparative advantages in cost. On the one hand, the low-skill expert has a lower
fixed cost than the high-skill expert, so that 0 < β. On the other hand, the low-skill
expert has a higher marginal cost of project difficulty than the high-skill expert, so
that 0 ≤ α < 1. Also, I assume that β
1−α < s¯ so that the high-skill expert is more
efficient in implementing some projects.
2In the healthcare context, a payer needs to provide medical service to a patient who bought an
insurance from him regardless of the severity of the patient’s illness.
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Define sfb as the difficulty level such that sfb = αsfb + β. Finally, define µl
as
∫ s¯
0
xdG(x), which denotes the low-skill expert’s average cost, and µh as
∫ s¯
0
(αx +
β)dG(x), which denotes the high-skill expert’s average cost.
Neither the Principal nor the experts observe projects’ states. However, an expert
can incur a cost f > 0 to acquire perfect information about a project’s state. The
Principal has no information acquisition capability.
2.2.2 First Best
An allocation consists of information acquisition(s) effort carried out by either or
both experts and an assignment of a project s to one of the experts. The first-
best allocation is one that minimizes project s’s expected information acquisition
and implementation cost. In the first best, at most one of the two experts acquires
information about the project’s state s. On the one hand, if an expert acquires infor-
mation, then the project is assigned to the expert who has the lower implementation
cost. On the other hand, if no one acquires information, then the project is assigned
to the expert who has the lower average cost. When µh ≤ µl, the first best involves
an expert acquiring information if and only if
sfb∫
0
xdG(x) +
s¯∫
sfb
[αx+ β]dG(x) + f ≤ µh
f ≤
sfb∫
0
[
β − (1− α)x]dG(x).
62
When µl ≤ µh, the first best involves an expert acquiring information if and only if
sfb∫
0
xdG(x) +
s¯∫
sfb
[αx+ β]dG(x) + f ≤ µl
f ≤
s¯∫
sfb
[
(1− α)x− β]dG(x).
Lemma 1 summarizes the first best.
Lemma 1 Let f fb ≡ min{ ∫ sfb
0
[
β− (1−α)x]dG(x), ∫ s¯
sfb
[
(1−α)x− β]dG(x)}. In
the first best, (i) if f > f fb, then no expert acquires information and the project s is
assigned to the expert who has the lower average cost, and (ii) if f ≤ f fb, then one
of the two experts acquires information and the project s is assigned to the low-skill
expert if s ≤ sfb and to the high-skill expert if s > sfb.
In the rest of the chapter, I present three classes of mechanisms. In each class,
the Principal offers a contract to both experts. In the first class, the Principal does
not induce experts to acquire information. In the second and the third class, the
Principal induces one expert to acquire information and then assigns the project
according to the information revealed by that expert. The expert who is induced to
acquire and reveal information is called the gatekeeper of the mechanism. I assume
that the gatekeeper can only acquire information after they accept a contract. As I
have explained in the introduction, this is justified by the practices of the healthcare
industry since physicians sign new contracts determining their payment schemes on
a yearly basis.
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2.3 Mechanism without a Gatekeeper
In this section, I analyze a mechanism in which the Principal does not induce experts
to acquire information. This works as a reference point for later sections. In Stage 1,
the Principal offers a contract
(
tl, th, pl
)
to the experts. The contract is a vector of
constants; tl is the Principal’s payment to the low-skill expert and th is the Principal’s
payment to the high-skill expert. The Principal assigns the project to the low-skill
expert with probability pl and to the high-skill expert with probability 1− pl.3
In Stage 2, both expert decide whether to accept the contract simultaneously. If
either expert rejects, then the game ends and everyone gets a payoff of zero. The game
proceeds if and only if each expert accepts the contract. Then, the Principal imple-
ments the contract according to the report. Finally, the assigned expert implements
the project.
The extensive form of the mechanism is the following. I call this a no-gatekeeper
mechanism.
Stage 1: The Principal has a project with state s determined by distribution G. He
offers a contract
(
tl, th, pl
)
to the experts.
Stage 2: Both experts decide whether to accept the contract simultaneously. If one
of them rejects, the game ends. If both accept, then the Principal pays the
low-skill expert tl and the high-skill expert th. He assigns the project to the
low-skill expert with probability pl and to the high-skill expert with 1 − pl.
Then, the assigned expert implements the project.
3I can instead analyze a contract
(
tl(s), th(s), pl(s), ph(s)
)
, with pl + ph ≤ 1, which would not
change the chapter’s results.
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The Principal’s strategy is defined by a decision to offer a contract in Stage 1.
The low-skill expert’s strategy is defined by a decision whether to accept a contract
in Stage 2 and the high-skill expert’s strategy is defined by a decision whether to
accept a contract in Stage 2. The solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Throughout the chapter, I only study equilibria in which both experts accept the
Principal’s contract. Furthermore, I define an optimal no-information mechanism as
a no-information mechanism that minimizes the Principal’s expected payment among
all no-information mechanisms. I call an equilibrium of a no-gatekeeper mechanism a
no-information equilibrium. An optimal no-information equilibrium is defined anal-
ogously. Finally, I call the contract in an optimal no-information equilibrium an
optimal no-information contract.
In a no-information equilibrium, both experts must accept the Principal’s contract
(t′l, t
′
h, p
′
l). Consequently, the contract must satisfy the low-skill expert’s acceptance
constraint
s¯∫
0
(t′l − p′lx)dG(x) ≥ 0, (2.1)
and the high-skill expert’s acceptance constraint
s¯∫
0
[
t′h − (1− p′l)(αx+ β)
]
dG(x) ≥ 0. (2.2)
An optimal no-information contract solves the following program.
min
t′l,p
′
l,t
′
h
s¯∫
0
[
t′l + t
′
h
]
dG(x), (2.3)
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subject to (2.1) and (2.2). In this minimization problem both (2.1) and (2.2) must
bind. I can substitute the binding constraints into the objective function to get
min
t′l,p
′
l,t
′
h
{
p′lµl + (1− p′l)µh
}
. (2.4)
An optimal no-information contract is simple; the Principal assigns projects regardless
of difficulty to the expert who has the lower average cost.
If f > f fb, then the first best does not involve information acquisition. Therefore,
the Principal can implement the first best by offering an optimal no-information
contract. This contract can also be used as a reference point in the next section.
2.4 Mechanism with a Gatekeeper
In this section, I analyze a mechanism in which an expert is chosen as a gatekeeper
to make a report. The gatekeeper can acquire information only after both experts
accept a contract. Suppose the low-skill expert is chosen as the gatekeeper. In Stage
1, the Principal offers a contract
(
tl(s), th(s), pl(s)
)
to the experts. The contract is
a vector of functions of the low-skill expert’s eventual report s ∈ S. The function
tl(s) is the Principal’s payment to the low-skill expert and the function th(s) is the
Principal’s payment to the high-skill expert. The Principal assigns the project to the
low-skill expert with probability pl(s) and to the high-skill expert with probability
1− pl(s).4
In Stage 2, both expert decide whether to accept the contract simultaneously. If
either expert rejects, then the game ends and everyone gets a payoff of zero. The
4As in the last section, I can instead analyze a contract
(
tl(s), th(s), pl(s), ph(s)
)
, with pl(s) +
ph(s) ≤ 1, which would not change the chapter’s results.
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game proceeds if and only if each expert accepts the contract. In Stage 3, the low-
skill expert decides whether to acquire information about the project. In Stage 4, the
low-skill expert makes a report s ∈ S. Then, the Principal implements the contract
according to the report. Finally, the assigned expert implements the project. The
case in which the high-skill expert is chosen as the gatekeeper is defined analogously.
I analyze it later in this section.
2.4.1 Low-skill Gatekeeper
The extensive form of a mechanism in which the low-skill expert is chosen as the
gatekeeper is the following. I call this a low-skill gatekeeper mechanism.
Stage 1: The Principal has a project with state s determined by distribution G. He
offers a contract
(
tl(s), th(s), pl(s)
)
, for all s ∈ S, to the experts.
Stage 2: Both experts decide whether to accept the contract simultaneously. If one
of them rejects, the game ends.
Stage 3: The low-skill expert decides whether to acquire information about the
project.
Stage 4: The low-skill expert makes a report s. The Principal pays the low-skill
expert tl(s) and the high-skill expert th(s). He assigns the project to the low-
skill expert with probability pl(s) and to the high-skill expert with 1 − pl(s).
Then, the assigned expert implements the project.
The Principal’s strategy is defined by a decision to offer a contract in Stage 1. The
low-skill expert’s strategy is defined by (i) a decision whether to accept a contract
in Stage 2, (ii) a decision whether to acquire information about the project in Stage
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3, and (iii) a report of the project type in Stage 4. The high-skill expert’s strategy
is defined by (i) a decision whether to accept a contract in Stage 2. The solution
concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
I only study equilibria in which both experts accept the Principal’s contract and
the low-skill gatekeeper acquires information. I define an optimal low-skill gatekeeper
mechanism as a low-skill gatekeeper mechanism that minimizes the Principal’s ex-
pected payment among all low-skill gatekeeper mechanisms. I call an equilibrium
of a low-skill gatekeeper mechanism a low-skill information equilibrium. An optimal
low-skill information equilibrium is defined analogously. Finally, I call the contract
in an optimal low-skill information equilibrium equilibrium an optimal low-skill in-
formation contract.
Definition 1 (Low-skill Information Equilibrium) In a low-skill information
equilibrium, the Principal offers a contract; the low-skill expert accepts, acquires in-
formation, and makes a report; and the high-skill expert accepts the contract.
Below I consider the constraints a Principal’s contract
(
tl(s), th(s), pl(s)
)
must
satisfy in a low-skill information equilibrium. In a Stage-4 continuation equilibrium,
the low-skill expert knows the state s. The contract is said to satisfy the low-skill
expert’s truthful-reporting constraint if
tl(s)− pl(s)s ≥ tl(sˆ)− pl(sˆ)s, for all s, sˆ ∈ S. (2.5)
The L.H.S. of (2.5) is the low-skill expert’s payoff reporting the true state excluding
the information acquisition cost and the R.H.S. is the low-skill expert’s payoff other-
wise. I define the low-skill expert’s Stage-4 continuation equilibrium payoff excluding
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the information acquisition cost as Vl(s) ≡ tl(s)− pl(s)s.
In a Stage-3 continuation equilibrium, if the low-skill expert incurs f and learns
that the state is s, then he can make a report and get maxsˆ{tl(sˆ) − pl(sˆ)s − f}. If
the low-skill expert does not acquire information, then he can make a report that
maximizes his payoff. The payoff of doing so is maxsˆ
∫ s¯
0
{
tl(sˆ) − pl(sˆ)x
}
dG(x). The
contract is said to satisfy the low-skill expert’s information acquisition constraint if
s¯∫
0
max
sˆ∈S
{tl(sˆ)− pl(sˆ)x}dG(x)− f ≥ max
sˆ
s¯∫
0
{
tl(sˆ)− pl(sˆ)x
}
dG(x). (2.6)
In a Stage-2 continuation equilibrium, the low-skill expert expects the high-skill
expert to accept the contract. If he accepts the contract, then he can make a report
with or without acquiring information. The payoff of doing each is discussed in the
above paragraph. The contract is said to satisfy the low-skill expert’s acceptance
constraint if
max
{ s¯∫
0
max
sˆ∈S
{tl(sˆ)− pl(sˆ)x}dG(x)− f,max
sˆ
s¯∫
0
{
tl(sˆ)− pl(sˆ)x
}
dG(x)
}
≥ 0. (2.7)
In a Stage-2 continuation equilibrium, the high-skill expert expects the low-skill
expert to accept the contract, acquire information, and report the true state. The
contract is said to satisfy the high-skill expert’s acceptance constraint if
s¯∫
0
[
th(x)− (1− pl(x))(αx+ β)
]
dG(x) ≥ 0. (2.8)
All in all, in a low-skill information equilibrium, the Principal’s contract
(
tl(s), th(s),
pl(s)
)
satisfies constraints (2.5)-(2.8). I concentrate on an optimal low-skill informa-
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tion contract, which solves the following program that I call Program 1:
min
tl(s),pl(s),th(s)
s¯∫
0
[
tl(x) + th(x)
]
dG(x), (2.9)
subject to (2.5)-(2.8).
I simplify Program 1 below. Lemma 2 is a standard result. The proof can be
found in Myerson (1981) or a standard textbook like Mas-Colell, Whinston, and
Green (1995).
Lemma 2 A contract
(
tl(s), th(s), pl(s)
)
satisfies the low-skill expert’s truthful-
reporting constraint (2.5) if and only if
(i) pl(s) is non-increasing and
(ii) Vl(s) = Vl(0)−
∫ s
0
pl(x)dx, for all s ∈ S.
I will refer the first condition (i) in Lemma 2 as the monotonicity condition. If a
contract satisfies (2.5), then Vl(s) can be rewritten as
Vl(s) ≡ tl(s)− pl(s)s = Vl(0)−
s∫
0
pl(x)dx (2.10)
= tl(0)−
s∫
0
pl(x)dx. (2.11)
The second line is true because V1(0) = tl(0)− pl(0)0 = tl(0). By (2.11),
tl(s) = pl(s)s+ tl(0)−
s∫
0
pl(x)dx. (2.12)
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In a solution of Program 1, (2.8) must bind because I can lower th(x) without affecting
other constraints;
s¯∫
0
[
th(x)− (1− pl(x))(αx+ β)
]
dG(x) = 0. (2.13)
For simplicity, I will concentrate on equilibria in which th(s) = (1 − pl(s))(αs + β),
∀s. Then, I can substitute (2.12) and (2.13) into (2.9) to get
min
tl(s),pl(s),th(s)
s¯∫
0
[
pl(x)x+ (1− pl(x))(αx+ β)
]
dG(x) + tl(0)−
s¯∫
0
y∫
0
pl(x)dxdG(y).
(2.14)
Since (2.5) is satisfied in a solution, Vl(s) = maxsˆ∈S{tl(sˆ)−pl(sˆ)x}. Also, the low-
skill expert’s information acquisition constraint (2.6) is satisfied, so his acceptance
constraint (2.7) is reduced to
s¯∫
0
[
tl(0)−
y∫
0
pl(x)dx
]
dG(y)− f ≥ 0 (2.15)
tl(0) ≥ f +
s¯∫
0
y∫
0
pl(x)dxdG(y). (2.16)
The objective function in (2.14) contains tl(0), so (2.16) must bind in a solution of
Program 1. This is because I can lower tl(0) without affecting (2.6). Also, I can
substitute the binding (2.16) into (2.12) and use integration by parts to get
tl(s) = pl(s)s+ f +
s¯∫
0
(1−G(x))pl(x)dx−
s∫
0
pl(x)dx (2.17)
Now, I can substitute the binding (2.16) into (2.14) so that Program 1 is now reduced
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to the following.
min
tl(s),pl(s),th(s)
s¯∫
0
[
pl(x)x+ (1− pl(x))(αx+ β)
]
dG(x) + f (2.18)
subject to pl(s) being non-increasing, (2.6), (2.13), and (2.17).
As shown above, the Principal minimizes his payment and extracts all rent from
both the low-skill expert and the high-skill expert. Lemma 3 further simplifies Pro-
gram 1. The proof is in the Appendix.
Lemma 3 Program 1 is equivalent to the following problem.
min
tl(s),pl(s),th(s)
s¯∫
0
[
pl(x)x+ (1− pl(x))(αx+ β)
]
dG(x) + f subject to (2.19)
f ≤
µl∫
0
k(x)pl(x)dG(x)−
s¯∫
µl
h(x)pl(x)dG(x), (2.20)
pl(s) being non-increasing, (2.13), and (2.17).
In Lemma 3, the low-skill expert’s information acquisition constraint is simplified
by integration by parts. Lemma 3 is intuitive. The Principal assigns projects to the
expert who has the lowest cost, but he has to make sure the contract satisfies experts’
acceptance, information acquisition, and truthful-reporting constraints.
Suppose the first best requires information acquisition. Can the Principal imple-
ments it through an optimal low-skill information mechanism? To see that, I plug
the efficient assignment rule, pl(s) = 1 for all s < s
fb and pl(s) for all s ≥ sfb, into
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the R.H.S of (2.20) to get the following term, which I call f ∗.
f ∗ ≡

∫ sfb
0
k(x)pl(x)dG(x), if s
fb < µl, and∫ µl
0
k(x)pl(x)dG(x)−
∫ sfb
µl
h(x)pl(x)dG(x), if s
fb ≥ µl.
In the proof of Proposition 1, I show that f ∗ must be larger than zero. Clearly,
the efficient assignment rule is non-increasing. Therefore, if f ≤ f ∗, then a low-skill
gatekeeper mechanism can implement the efficient assignment rule. Moreover, if f ∗ ≥
f fb, then a low-skill gatekeeper mechanism can implement the efficient assignment rule
whenever the first best requires information acquisition. Therefore, the optimal low-
skill gatekeeper mechanism implements the first best while extracting all rent from
the experts. It is without loss of generality to concentrate on low-skill gatekeeper
mechanism. Proposition 1 shows that f ∗ ≥ f fb is indeed true. The proof is in the
Appendix.
Proposition 1 Suppose the first best requires information acquisition. Then, it is
without loss of generality to focus on low-skill gatekeeper mechanism. The Principal
implements the first best and extracts all rent through the optimal low-skill gatekeeper
mechanism.
To sum up, the Principal is able to choose the low-skill expert to be the gatekeeper
because of the following reason. The pl(s) function is non-increasing because of the
truthful reporting constraint. To exploit experts’ cost comparative advantages, the
Principal wants to assign projects so that pl(s) is also decreasing. Indeed, the Prin-
cipal is able to assign project efficiently while incentivizing information acquisition
and truthful reporting. As we can see next, this is not the case when the high-skill
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expert is chosen as the gatekeeper.
Finally, I discuss the low-skill expert’s payment functions in the optimal low-skill
information contract. Plug the efficient assignment rule into (2.17) to get
tl(s) =

pl(s)s+ f +
∫ s¯
0
(1−G(x))pl(x)dx−
∫ s
0
pl(x)dx, if s < s
fb, and
f +
∫ s¯
0
(1−G(x))pl(x)dx−
∫ s
0
pl(x)dx, if s ≥ sfb.
tl(s) =

f − ∫ sfb
0
G(x)dx+ sfb, if s < sfb, and
f − ∫ sfb
0
G(x)dx, if s ≥ sfb.
In the optimal low-skill information contract, the Principal pays the low-skill gate-
keeper f in order to cover his information acquisition cost. The Principal pays an
additional amount of sfb if the low-skill gatekeeper reports the project difficulty to
be lower than sfb. This incentivizes the low-skill gatekeeper to acquire information.
Finally, the Principal reduces the payment by
∫ sfb
0
G(x)dx in order to extract all rent
from the low-skill gatekeeper.
2.4.2 High-skill Expert Gatekeeper
In this section, I analyze a mechanism in which the high-skill expert is chosen as
the gatekeeper. Experts’ roles are interchanged. The Principal offers a contract(
tl(s), th(s), ph(s)
)
to the experts. Still, the function tl(s) is the Principal’s payment
to the low-skill expert and th(s) is the payment to high-skill expert. The functions
1−ph(s) and ph(s) are the Principal’s assignment probabilities to the low-skill and the
high-skill expert, respectively. However, after both experts accept the contract, only
the high-skill expert can acquire information and make a report s ∈ S. The contract
is a vector of functions of the high-skill expert’s report. Similar to the last section,
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I can define an optimal high-skill gatekeeper mechanism, a high-skill information
equilibrium, an optimal high-skill information equilibrium, and an optimal high-skill
information contract.
In a high-skill information equilibrium, the Principal’s contract satisfies the high-
skill expert’s truthful-reporting constraint, the high-skill expert’s information acquisi-
tion constraint, the high-skill expert’s acceptance constraint, and the low-skill expert’s
acceptance constraint, all of which are defined analogously as in the last section.
Suppose the Principal offers a contract
(
tl(s), th(s), ph(s)
)
in a high-skill informa-
tion equilibrium. The Principal’s minimum expected cost to incentivize information
acquisition and then use the information to assign the project to the low-skill ex-
pert with probability 1− ph(s) and to the high-skill expert with probability ph(s) is∫ s¯
0
[
(1− ph(x))x+ ph(x)(αx+ β)
]
dG(x) + f .
Furthermore, similar to Lemma 3, the high-skill gatekeeper reports project infor-
mation truthfully only if his project assignment probability ph(s) is non-increasing.
The proof is in the Appendix.
Lemma 4 A contract
(
tl(s), th(s), ph(s)
)
satisfies the high-skill expert’s truthful-
reporting constraint only if ph(s) is non-increasing.
Therefore, the Principal’s expected equilibrium cost of a high-skill information
equilibrium must be larger than the solution to the following problem, which I call
Program 2.
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min
ph(x)
s¯∫
0
[
(1− ph(x))x+ ph(x)(αx+ β)
]
dG(x) subject to ph(x) being non-increasing.
This leads to the following result.
Proposition 2 The Principal’s expected payoff in an equilibrium of a high-skill
gatekeeper mechanism is lower than his expected payoff in an equilibrium of an optimal
no-gatekeeper mechanism.
The proof is in the Appendix. In order to exploit experts’ cost comparative ad-
vantages in high-skill gatekeeper mechanism, the Principal should assign less difficult
projects to the low-skill experts and more difficult projects to the high-skill experts.
However, in order to incentivize the high-skill expert gatekeeper to reveal the truth,
Lemma 4 says that the Principal should do the opposite and assigns less difficult
projects to the high-skill experts and more difficult projects to the low-skill experts.
Such a mechanism is unable to exploit experts’ cost comparative advantages and
leads to a high implementation cost. Indeed, it performs worse than an optimal
no-gatekeeper mechanism.
2.5 More General Cost Structure
In this section, I change the assumption that the high-skill expert’s cost function ch(s)
is linear and study other functional forms. Throughout the section, I maintain the
assumption that ch(s) has a lower slope than s and ch(s) and s cross only once at s
fb.
That is, ch(s) satisfies 0 ≤ c′h(s) < 1, 0 < ch(0), and ch(s¯) < s¯. I first consider a case
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in which I relax the assumption on the high-skill expert’s cost function ch(s) but put
more structure on the distribution function. Then, I discuss the case in which ch(s)
and the distribution function are more general. Note that Proposition 2 holds as long
as ch(s) and s cross only once and ch(s) is increasing. Therefore, I concentrate on
low-skill gatekeeper mechanism in the rest of the section.
First, I make the assumption that h(s) is convex. In auction theory, this amounts
to the assumption that the virtual valuation is concave. There are some densities
that satisfy the convex h(s) assumption. Clearly, the uniform distribution has a
linear h(s) function. By Mierendorff (2016), h(s) is convex if the density is linear and
increasing, for example, g(s) = 1− b + 2bs, b ∈ (0, 1], or the density is a power of s,
for example, g(s) = (b+ 1)sb, b > 0. Also by Mierendorff (2016), a hump-shaped or a
U-shaped density can have a convex h(s) function. For example, g(s) = 3
2
− 6(s− 1
2
)2
is hump-shaped and g(s) = 12(s − 1
2
)2 is U-shaped and both have a convex h(s)
function.
Second, I make the assumption that ch(s) is concave. That means the difference
of marginal cost of difficulty between the two experts is weakly increasing when
project difficulty increases. The high-skill expert has an advantage in marginal cost
of difficulty and this advantage weakly increases for more difficult projects. As can be
seen in the proof of Proposition 1, the Principal can implement the first best even if
ch(s) is concave using a combination of optimal low-skill gatekeeper mechanism and
optimal no-information mechanism when sfb < µl or µl ≤ sfb and µl ≤ µh.5
Suppose µl ≤ sfb and µh < µl. The proof of Proposition 1 does not apply. Since
5Parts of the proof of Proposition 1 applies here because a linear function is also concave.
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µh < µl, the first best requires information acquisition if
f ≤
sfb∫
0
[
ch(x)− x
]
dG(x). (2.21)
Now, plug pl(s) = 1 for s ≤ sfb and pl(s) = 0 for s > sfb into the R.H.S. of
the information acquisition constraint (2.20) in Lemma 3 to get
∫ µl
0
k(x)dG(x) −∫ sfb
µl
h(x)dG(x), which is larger than zero as seen in the proof of Proposition 1. There-
fore, an optimal low-skill information equilibrium assigns projects to the expert who
has the lowest cost if
f ≤
µl∫
0
k(x)dG(x)−
sfb∫
µl
h(x)dG(x). (2.22)
Note that if the R.H.S. of (2.22) is larger than the R.H.S. of (2.21). Then, an
optimal low-skill equilibrium implements the first best whenever the first best requires
information acquisition. Let’s consider their difference:
µl∫
0
k(x)dG(x)−
sfb∫
µl
h(x)dG(x)−
sfb∫
0
[
ch(x)− x
]
dG(x)
=
sfb∫
0
G(x)dx−
sfb∫
µl
dx−
sfb∫
0
[
ch(x)− x
]
dG(x)
=
sfb∫
0
G(x)dx−
sfb∫
µl
dx−
[(
ch(x)− x
)
G(x)
]sfb
0
+
sfb∫
0
G(x)d
(
ch(x)− x
)
=
sfb∫
0
c′h(x)G(x)dx− (sfb − µl).
If this is positive, then whenever µh < µl, µl ≤ sfb, and the first best requires infor-
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mation acquisition, then the optimal low-skill gatekeeper mechanism implements the
first-best. Suppose this is negative, then when µh < µl, µl ≤ sfb, and the information
acquisition cost f is intermediate such that
∫ µl
0
G(x)dx − ∫ sfb
µl
(1 − G(x))dx < f ≤∫ sfb
0
[
ch(x)− x
]
dG(x), the first best requires information acquisition but the optimal
low-skill gatekeeper mechanism cannot implement the first-best. Let’s study an op-
timal information contract in this case. To do that, I consider a relaxed problem for
the Principal in Lemma 3 by ignoring the monotonicity constraint, (2.13), and (2.17),
which I call Program 1∗. The Lagrangian is
L = −
s¯∫
0
[
pl(x)x+ (1− pl(x))ch(x)
]
dG(x)− f
+ λ
[ µl∫
0
k(x)pl(x)dG(x)−
s¯∫
µl
h(x)pl(x)dG(x)− f
]
. (2.23)
Point-wise optimization generates the following first-order derivative with respect to
pl(s) at each s. I call it ∆(s).
∆(s) ≡

[ch(s)− s+ λk(s)]g(s), if s < µl, and
[ch(s)− s− λh(s)]g(s), if s ≥ µl.
(2.24)
Furthermore, define the term in the square bracket D(s). In the Appendix, I show
that D(s), and therefore ∆(s), can only change sign once or thrice due to the concave
cost function and the convex inverse hazard rate, which leads to the following result
(proof in the Appendix).
Proposition 3 Suppose the inverse hazard rate h(s) is convex and the high-skill
expert cost function ch(s) is concave. Also, µl ≤ sfb and µh < µl. An optimal low-
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skill information equilibrium exists if f ≤ ∫ µl
0
k(x)dG(x). In an optimal low-skill
information contract
(
pl(s), tl(s), th(s)
)
, if f ≤ ∫ µl
0
k(x)dG(x)− ∫ sfb
µl
h(x)dG(x), then
pl(s) = 1 for all s ≤ sfb and pl(s) = 0 for all s > sfb. If f satisfies
∫ µl
0
k(x)dG(x)−∫ sfb
µl
h(x)dG(x) < f ≤ ∫ µl
0
k(x)dG(x), then the probability assignment function of the
optimal low-skill information contract must be in one of the following two forms.
(i) pl(s) = 1 for all s ≤ sˆ and pl(s) = 0 for all s > sˆ, with f =
∫ µl
0
k(x)dG(x) −∫ sˆ
µl
h(x)dG(x).
(ii) pl(s) = 1 for all s ≤ µl, pl(s) = a for s satisfying µl < s ≤ sˆ, and pl(s) = 0
for s satisfying s > sˆ, with f =
∫ µl
0
k(x)dG(x)− ∫ sˆ
µl
ah(x)dG(x).
Proposition 3 says that the assignment rule of an optimal low-skill information con-
tract must be described by one of the following two cases. First, the function D(s)
changes sign only once from positive to negative as s increases. Then, the Principal
can set the probability assignment function according to the point-wise derivative
without violating the monotonicity condition, so it is a threshold assignment rule
where all low-difficulty projects are assigned to the low-skill expert and all high-
difficulty projects are assigned to the high-skill expert.
In the second case, the function D(s) changes from positive to negative to positive
and then back to negative as s increases. At the two extreme, the Principal can set
the probability assignment according to the point-wise derivative without violating
the monotonicity condition; the Principal assigns all low-difficulty and high-difficulty
projects to the low-skill and high-skill expert, respectively. However, in the middle,
he cannot do that without violating the monotonicity condition. Therefore, he assigns
medium-difficulty projects to the low-skill expert with a fixed probability. All in all,
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the probability assignment function decreases in project difficulty in two steps. I am
able to pin down the possible number of times the D(s) function changes sign because
the second derivative of D(s) is negative.
Finally, I discuss a more relaxed cost function for the high-skill expert and a
general distribution. Suppose that ch(s) satisfies 0 ≤ c′h(s) < 1, 0 < ch(0), and
ch(s¯) < s¯. Proposition 2 still holds so that it is never optimal to choose a high-skill
gatekeeper. The allocation of an optimal low-skill information equilibrium is now
different. By the same logic of the proof of Proposition 3, it is still true that when s
is close to zero, D(s) is positive. Also, when s is close to s¯, D(s) is negative. Therefore,
the Principal assigns all low-difficulty and high-difficulty projects to the low-skill and
high-skill expert, respectively. However, the D(s) function’s second derivative cannot
be pinned down because of the generality of the model. When s is intermediate, pl(s)
is a step function, but there may be more than two steps because the D(s) function
may change sign multiple times.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I provide a model to study the organization of expertise. A Principal
relies on a group of experts with different cost comparative advantages to implement
a project, but he relies on the same group of experts to acquire and report information
about the project so that he can assign it efficiently among the experts. I find that only
a low-skill expert can be used as a gatekeeper. When the Principal designs a contract
for a low-skill gatekeeper mechanism, he is able to align his need to incentivize truthful
reporting with his objective to reduce project cost. This cannot be done when there
is a high-skill gatekeeper. When experts’ cost structure is linear, the optimal low-
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skill gatekeeper mechanism also implements the first best. That means focusing on
gatekeeper mechanism is without loss of generality. I also study gatekeeper mechanism
with a more general cost structure. The major qualitative result of the model remains
valid. The model can be used to understand the widespread usage of low-skill and
low-cost gatekeeper in various industries.
There are rooms for future research. First, if information acquisition is not perfect,
then the Principal may want to solicit opinions from multiple experts before he assigns
the project. It would be interesting to see if a corresponding low-skill gatekeeper
mechanism remains valid. Second, in this model, project information is used by the
Principal to assign a project. However, project information may also be used by an
expert to tailor project implementation effort. It remains to be seen how the model
would change when project implementation is more explicitly modeled and project
information can be used in a rich way.
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Chapter 3
Information Acquisitions and Referrals
between Experts
3.1 Introduction
In an economy, production efficiency often depends on the correct match between
projects and production experts. However, information about the type of a project
is often absent, and only experts who are able to implement the project have the
ability to learn about the project’s type. Moreover, information acquisition may be
imperfect and experts may have to coordinate their information-acquisition efforts in
order to aggregate information in an efficient way. This chapter intends to study the
efficiency of a market in incentivizing experts’ information acquisitions, coordinating
experts’ information acquisitions, and matching projects to experts.
In my model, there is a set of projects; each project has a different difficulty state.
There are two experts, and each can complete a project by incurring a fixed cost and a
variable cost. Each expert’s variable cost is increasing in project difficulty. However,
the two experts have different cost comparative advantages. A low-skill expert has a
low fixed cost and a high variable cost, whereas the opposite is true for a high-skill
expert. In the first best, if projects’ difficulties are known, then the low-skill expert
should complete less difficult projects and the high-skill expert should complete more
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difficult projects.
The two experts have the same information acquisition technology. Each of them
can exert an effort to acquire information about a project’s difficulty. An expert’s
information-acquisition effort may or may not succeed. If it succeeds, then the expert
learns about the project’s difficulty. If it fails, then the expert remains uninformed.
A higher effort increases the probability of a successful information acquisition, and
expert’s information acquisition cost is an increasing and convex function in effort. In
the first best, the two experts should coordinate their information-acquisition effort.
One expert acquires information first. If he succeeds, then the project is assigned
efficiently. If he fails, then another expert acquires information. The first expert
exerts less effort, while the second expert exerts more effort.
I first study an ascending referral market where the low-skill expert is initially
assigned a project. He decides whether to exert effort to acquire information about
the project. Then, he decides whether to complete the project himself or refer it to
the high-skill expert by choosing a referral payment. Upon receiving a payment offer,
the high-skill expert decides whether to exert effort to acquire information. Then he
decides whether to accept the offer. If he accepts, then he completes the project and
receives the referral payment. If he rejects, then the low-skill expert completes the
project. Later, I study a descending referral market where experts’ roles are reversed.
I find that in both markets, experts are able to refer projects to each other.
Either one or both experts acquire information. In both ascending and descending
referrals, experts fail to coordinate their information-acquisition efforts. Even if both
experts acquire information, one expert acquires information so that the information
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is used to match the project to the appropriate expert, and the other expert acquires
information again to protect himself from getting a costly project.
3.1.1 Literature Review
Two important papers about referral are Garicano and Santos (2004) and Grassi and
Ma (2016). The former paper does not incorporate information acquisition into their
model. They assume that the referring expert has private and exogenous informa-
tion about a project. Grassi and Ma (2016) study the referring expert’s incentive to
acquire information but rule out the possibility of the referred expert acquiring infor-
mation. In both papers, referral market is inefficient and in some situation it unravels
completely. This chapter shows that referral happens in both the ascending and the
descending market. Information acquisition allows an expert to protect himself from
the costliest project, so markets do not unravel completely. Secondly, a richer model
allows me to study whether experts would coordinate their information-acquisition
efforts.
This chapter is also related to the bargaining literature. Samuelson (1984) studies
a bargaining problem where asymmetric information is exogenous. Shavell (1994)
studies a one-sided information acquisition problem where a party who acquires in-
formation may voluntary disclose his information. Dang (2008) studies a two-sided
information acquisition problem where information acquisition is socially wasteful
and gain from trade is common knowledge. This chapter studies a problem where
project information is needed to determine whether there is a gain from trade. And
both sides should coordinate information acquisition in order to improve efficiency.
Finally, this chapter is related to the credence good literature. The literature
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concentrates on the interaction between expert and client. For example, Dulleck and
Kerschbamer (2006), which is a survey of the literature, and Fong, Liu, and Wright
(2014) study a market where an expert has an informational advantage over a client
that he is serving. Instead, this chapter studies the interaction between experts in a
referral market.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the
model setup and the first best. Section 3.3 studies an ascending market. Section
3.4 studies a descending market. Section 3.5 concludes. Finally, Appendix contains
proofs of results.
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Projects, Experts, and Information Structure
There are two risk-neutral experts, a low-skill expert and a high-skill expert. Either
expert can complete a project at a cost. An expert’s project cost is a function of the
project state. The set of all project states is Ω ≡ {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4, ω5}. The probability
of state ωi is p(ωi), for i = 1, ..., 5. Let pi ≡ p(ωi), for i = 1, ..., 5. A higher project
state indicates a more difficult project. When the project state is ωi, then the low-
skill expert’s implementation cost is si, whereas the high-skill expert’s is αsi + β,
for i = 1, ..., 5, with s1 < s2 < s3 < s4 < s5. I assume that the high-skill expert
has a lower marginal cost with 0 < α < 1 and a higher fixed cost with β > 0. I
assume that project ω3 is the state at which the two experts’ cost are equal. That is,
s3 = αs3 + β. I also assume that α
∑
i pisi = s3. The two assumptions s3 = αs3 + β
and α
∑
i pisi = s3 imply that the two experts’ ex ante costs are the same. Finally,
I assume that s2 < αs1 + β, and αs5 + β < s4. The last two assumptions say that
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experts’ comparative advantages are large; the low-skill expert’s cost for project s2 is
lower than the high-skill expert’s cost for project s1, whereas the high-skill expert’s
cost for project s5 is lower than the low-skill expert’s cost for project s4. These two
assumptions also imply that the low-skill expert is more efficient in project s1 and s2
and the high-skill expert is more efficient in project s4 and s5.
An expert may acquire information about a project at a cost by choosing a prob-
ability θ, which satisfies 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. His information acquisition succeeds with proba-
bility θ. If he succeeds, he learns about the project state perfectly. If he fails, then he
does not learn anything. An expert’s information acquisition cost k(θ) is increasing
and convex such that k(0) = 0, k′ > 0, k′′ > 0, limθ→0 k′(θ) = 0, and limθ→1 k(θ) =∞.
An expert’s information acquisition device can only be used once. If an expert incurs
k(θ) to investigate a project but fails, then he cannot acquire information again.
3.2.2 First Best
An allocation consists of information acquisition costs incurred by either or both
experts and an assignment of a project to an expert according to the information
learned by the experts. The first-best allocation minimizes experts’ expected project
cost and information costs. If project state is revealed, then projects ω1, ω2, and
ω3 are assigned to the low-skill expert, whereas projects ω4 and ω5 are assigned to
the high-skill expert.1 Moreover, experts acquire information in a sequential way. If
one expert succeeds in acquiring information, then the other expert does not have
to acquire information and the project is assigned according to the project state. If
the first expert fails, then the other expert acquires information. If the other expert
succeeds, then the project is assigned efficiently. If the other expert fails as well, then
1The two experts’ cost completing project ω3 are the same.
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the project is assigned to the low-skill expert.2
Suppose θ′ and θ′′ are the first and the second experts’ information acquisition
probabilities, respectively. Then, the first best chooses a vector of information acqui-
sition probability (θfbl , θ
fb
h ) to solve the following minimization problem.
(θfbl , θ
fb
h ) =argmin(θ′,θ′′)
{
k(θ′) + θ′
[ 3∑
i=1
pisi +
5∑
i=4
pi(αsi + β)
]
+ (1− θ′)
[
k(θ′′) + θ′′
( 2∑
i=1
pisi +
5∑
i=4
pi(αsi + β)
)
+ (1− θ′′)s3
]}
First-order conditions imply
k′(θfbh ) =
5∑
i=4
pi(si − αsi − β) (3.1)
and
k′(θfbl ) =(1− θfbh )
[ 5∑
i=4
pi(si − αsi − β)
]
+ k(θfbh ) (3.2)
Consider the function θk′(θ) and k(θ). They are both equal to zero when θ = 0.
However, θk′(θ) > k(θ) for any θ > 0 because k′(θ) + θk′′(θ) > k′(θ). Therefore, by
(3.1), θfbh
[∑5
i=4 pi(si−αsi−β)
]
> k(θfbh ). This implies that θ
fb
l < θ
fb
h , by comparing
(3.1) and (3.2).
Therefore, in the first best, the first expert acquires information by choosing proba-
bility θfbl . If he fails, then the second expert acquires information by choosing a higher
probability θfbh .
2The two experts’ ex anote project cost are the same.
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3.3 Ascending Referral Market
In this section, I study an ascending referral market where the low-skill expert de-
cides whether to complete the project or refer it to the high-skill expert. I study a
descending referral market where the high-skill expert may refer in the next section.
Here is the extensive form of the ascending referral market.
Stage 1: The low-skill expert has a project, with state ω ∈ Ω determined by the
probability function p(ω). He chooses his information-acquisition probability θl
by incurring cost k(θl). Then, he decides whether to complete the project or
refer it to the high-skill expert by offering a payment t.
Stage 2: The high-skill expert chooses his information acquisition-probability θh by
incurring cost k(θh). Then, he decides whether or not to accept the referral.
If he accepts, he receives t and completes the project. If he rejects, then the
low-skill expert completes the project.
In the extensive form, project’s probability function, experts’ cost functions,
and information-acquisition function are experts’ common knowledge. Information-
acquisition probability, the revealed project’s state when an expert’s information ac-
quisition succeeds, and an expert’s realized project cost are private. The only con-
tractible event is project completion and the identity of the expert who completes a
project. Thus, the low-skill expert may refer a project at a payment.
3.3.1 Strategies and Beliefs
This section defines experts’ strategies and the high-skill expert’s belief. The low-
skill expert’s strategy is defined by (i) an information-acquisition probability, (ii) a
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decision to complete the project, and (iii) a referral payment if he decides to refer the
project to the high-skill expert. The low-skill expert’s decision to complete or refer
the project and referral payment are functions of project’s information he has learned
through information acquisition. The high-skill expert’s strategy is defined by (i) an
information acquisition probability and (ii) a referral acceptance decision. The high-
skill expert’s information-acquisition probability is a function of referral payment.
His acceptance decision is a function of referral payment and project’s information
he has learned through information acquisition.
I only consider referral payments with values between s1 and s5, which is without
loss of generality. In stage 2, after receiving a payment offer, the high-skill expert
forms a belief about the referred project’s state. His belief about a project in state ω
is a probability function µ : [s1, s5]×Ω→ [0, 1]. That means µ(t, ω) is the probability
mass that the high-skill expert assigns to project ω when the referral payment is t.
Naturally,
∑
Ω µ(t, ω) = 1. I assume that the low-skill expert prefers completing a
project to referring it when he is indifferent. Also, I assume that the high-skill expert
prefers accepting a referral when he is indifferent.
A tuple of strategies and belief is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the ascending
referral market if the strategies are mutual best responses given the belief and the
belief is updated according to the strategies and Bayes’ rule whenever possible. I
restrict my attention to pure strategy equilibria.
Consider the following equilibrium. The low-skill expert acquires information at
probability θ′. If he fails, he completes the project. If he succeeds, he completes
projects ω1, ω2, and ω3. And he refers projects ω4 and ω5. There are many unreached
information sets in this equilibrium. Perfect Bayesian equilibria place no restriction
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on the high-skill expert’s belief when he receives an off-equilibrium payment t 6= t′.
In this chapter, I use the following simple belief restriction.
Definition 1 (Pessimistic Belief) An equilibrium is said to satisfy pessimistic be-
lief if the high-skill firm believes that a referred project at any off-equilibrium payment
has the state ω5.
In the below, I study equilibria with the following characteristics. The low-skill
expert acquires information. When information acquisition fails, he completes the
project. When it succeeds, he completes certain projects and refers the remaining
at a specific equilibrium payment. The high-skill expert may or may not acquire
information depending on the payment level. The high-skill expert makes optimal
acceptance decision based on the project information he has learned through infor-
mation acquisition. As I will show, they are the only equilibria.
3.3.2 Low-skill Expert’s Equilibrium Strategy
In this subsection, I study the low-skill expert’s equilibrium strategy. First, I show
that the low-skill expert acquires information in an equilibrium, and he refers a project
only after a successful information acquisition.
Lemma 1 In an equilibrium, the low-skill expert refers a project only after a suc-
cessful information acquisition.
The proof is in the Appendix. In the first best, when information acquisition
is successful, the low-skill expert completes projects in low states and the high-skill
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expert completes projects in high states. In an equilibrium, a referral is feasible if and
only if projects are assigned to exploit experts’ comparative advantages as in the first
best. And projects can be assigned to do that only if the low-skill expert successfully
acquires information.
In Lemma 2, I show that there does not exist an equilibrium where the low-
skill expert completes a project without information acquisition. The proof is in the
Appendix.
Lemma 2 The low-skill expert acquires information in an equilibrium.
If there was an equilibrium where the low-skill expert did not acquire information
and complete the project, then there would be a profitable deviation. The reason
is that the low-skill expert could acquire information at a very low probability. If it
succeeded, he would refer the projects ω4 and ω5 at payment αs5 +β. If it failed, then
he would completed the project. This deviation is profitable because the high-skill
expert would accept a referral without information acquisition at payment αs5 + β,
and the low-skill expert’s information acquisition cost is low when the probability is
low, with limθ→0 k(θ) = 0.
In Lemma 3, I show that the low-skill expert would not refer projects ω1, ω2, or
ω3 after a successful information acquisition because such a referral failed to exploit
experts’ comparative advantages. The proof is in the Appendix.
Lemma 3 In an equilibrium, it would not be profitable for the low-skill expert to
refer projects ω1, ω2, or ω3 after a successful information acquisition.
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In Lemma 4, I show that any equilibrium has a simple structure such that it has
only one equilibrium payment. This result is due to the five-type structure of the
model. The proof is in the Appendix.
Lemma 4 In an equilibrium, there is only one equilibrium payment.
3.3.3 Equilibrium Characterization
Lemmas 1-4 show that, in an equilibrium, the low-skill expert acquires information
and refers some projects if it succeeds. In this subsection, I show that there are only
two classes of equilibria. In the first, only the low-skill expert acquires information.
In the second, both experts acquire information. I call an equilibrium in the first
class a single-acquisition equilibrium and an equilibrium in the second class a double-
acquisition equilibrium. In Proposition 1, I show that there is always a unique single-
acquisition equilibrium. Later in this section, I derive a sufficient condition for the
existence of a double-acquisition equilibrium.
Proposition 1 A unique single-acquisition equilibrium exists, which is characterized
by (θ∗l , t
∗) such that θ∗1 satisfies k
′(θ∗l ) =
∑5
i=4 pi(si−αs5−β) and t∗ = αs5 +β. Here
are the equilibrium strategies and beliefs.
(i) The low-skill expert acquires information at probability θ∗l . If he succeeds in
acquiring information, he refers projects ω4 and ω5 at payment t
∗ and completes
the rest. If he does not have project information, he completes the project.
(ii) The high-skill expert does not acquire information at any payment. He accepts
a referral at t ≥ αs5 + β and rejects a referral at t < αs5 + β. If he succeeds in
93
acquiring information at t 6= t∗, then he accepts if project cost is lower than t.
If he fails, then he accepts t ≥ αs5 + β and rejects t < αs5 + β.
(iii) At an off-equilibrium payment, the high-skill expert believes the project is in
state ω5.
In the rest of the section, I study a double-acquisition equilibrium. The low-skill
expert acquires information at θ∗l . If he succeeds, he refer projects ω4 and ω5 at
payment t∗ and completes the rest. If he fails, he completes the project. The low-skill
expert refers projects ω4 and ω5 after a successful information acquisition so that the
high-skill expert has incentive to acquire information, and he completes the project
in other scenarios because of Lemmas 1 and 3.
The high-skill expert acquires information at θ∗h. If information acquisition suc-
ceeds, he accepts project ω4 and rejects project ω5. If it fails, he accepts the referral
at t∗. The high-skill expert accepts ω4 and rejects ω5 because of the cost difference.
If the high-skill expert rejected an equilibrium referral after a failed information ac-
quisition, then the low-skill expert had no incentive to refer project ω5 because it
would be always rejected. Therefore, the high-skill expert must accepts an equilib-
rium referral after a failed information acquisition. Below, I examine the necessary
and sufficient conditions (θ∗l , θ
∗
h, t
∗) has to satisfy under which a double-acquisition
equilibrium exists.
First, at the end of stage 2, the high-skill expert accepts the equilibrium referral
at t∗ when information acquisition fails if and only if his expected payoff is higher
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than zero;
1
p4 + p5
5∑
i=4
pi
[
t∗ − αsi − β
] ≥ 0 (3.3)
t∗ ≥ αp4s4 + p5s5
p4 + p5
+ β. (3.4)
Second, in the middle of stage 2, the high-skill expert’s optimal information acquisi-
tion probability θ∗h satisfies
θ∗h = argminθ
{ 1
p4 + p5
[
θp4(t
∗ − αs4 − β) + (1− θ)
5∑
i=4
pi(t
∗ − αsi − β)
]
+ k(θ)
}
(3.5)
k′(θ∗h) =
p5
p4 + p5
(αs5 + β − t∗). (3.6)
In the square bracket on the right hand side of (3.5), p4
p4+p5
(t∗ − αs4 − β) is the
high-skill expert’s expected payoff when information acquisition succeeds. Moreover,
1
p4+p5
∑5
i=4(t
∗ − αsi − β) is his expected payoff when it fails.
Third, in the beginning of stage 2, recall that the high-skill expert acquires infor-
mation if and only if the equilibrium payment is lower than his project ω5’s cost;
t∗ < αs5 + β. (3.7)
Fourth, at the end of stage 1, the low-skill expert refers project ω4 at the equilibrium
payment t∗ if and only if t∗ is lower than his cost;
t∗ < s4. (3.8)
Fifth, at the end of stage 1, the low-skill expert refers project ω5 at the equilibrium
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payment t∗ if and only if his expected referral cost is lower than his project cost. The
low-skill expert’s expected referral cost is θ∗hs5 + (1 − θ∗h)t∗. This is because if the
high-skill expert rejects him, which happens with probability θ∗h, he has to complete
the project with cost s5;
θ∗hs5 + (1− θ∗h)t∗ < αs5 + β. (3.9)
Sixth, at the end of stage 1, the low-skill expert prefers completing projects ω1, ω2,
and ω3 to referring them at equilibrium price t
∗ if and only if
s3 < t
∗. (3.10)
Finally, in the beginning of stage 1, the low-skill expert optimal information acquisi-
tion probability θ∗l satisfies
θ∗l = argminθ
{
θ
[ 3∑
i=1
pisi + p4t
∗ + p5
(
θ∗hs5 + (1− θ∗h)t∗
)]
+ (1− θ)s3 + k(θ)
}
(3.11)
k′(θ∗l ) = p4(s4 − t∗) + p5(1− θ∗h)(s5 − t∗). (3.12)
Given t∗ and θ∗h, (3.12) gives us a unique θ
∗
l . Therefore, a double-acquisition equilib-
rium exists if there exists t∗ and θ∗h that satisfy (3.4), (3.6), (3.7), (3.8), (3.9), and
(3.10). These conditions simplify to (3.12),
α
p4s4 + p5s5
p4 + p5
+ β < t∗ < min
{
αs5 + β,
(α− θ∗h)s5 + β
1− θ∗h
}
, and (3.13)
k′(θ∗h) =
p5
p4 + p5
(αs5 + β − t∗). (3.14)
Proposition 2 characterizes a double-acquisition equilibrium.
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Proposition 2 A double-acquisition equilibrium exists if and only if there exists t∗,
θ∗l , and θ
∗
h that satisfy (3.12), (3.13), and (3.14). Here are the equilibrium strategies
and beliefs.
(i) The low-skill expert acquires information at probability θ∗l . If he succeeds in
acquiring information, he refers projects ω4 and ω5 at payment t
∗ and completes
the rest. If he fails, he completes the project.
(ii) At t∗, the high-skill expert acquires information at probability θ∗h. If he succeeds,
he accepts projects ω4 and ω5. If he fails, he accepts the referral at t
∗. Finally,
if he receives a referral at t 6= t∗, he does not acquire information. He accepts
t ≥ αs5 + β and rejects t < αs5 + β. If he succeeds in acquiring information at
t 6= t∗, then he accepts if project cost is lower than t. If he fails, then he accepts
t ≥ αs5 + β and rejects t < αs5 + β.
(iii) At an off-equilibrium payment, the high-skill expert believes the project is in
state ω5.
3.4 Descending Referral Market
In this section, I study a descending referral market where the experts’ roles are
reversed. I focus on equilibria where there is only one equilibrium payment. Similar
to the last section, there can be two classes of equilibrium. In an equilibrium of the
first class, which is called a single-acquisition equilibrium, only one expert acquires
information. In an equilibrium of the second class, which is called a double-acquisition
equilibrium, both experts acquire information. I will study the first class and discuss
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the second class. Lemma 8 shows that in the descending referral market, the referred
low-skill expert always acquires information. This is in contrast to the ascending
referral market.
Lemma 8 In an equilibrium of the descending referral market, the low-skill expert
acquires information at equilibrium payment t∗.
The proof is in the Appendix. Lemma 8 implies that in a single-acquisition equi-
librium, the high-skill expert refers a project without information acquisition. He
leaves the information acquisition task for the low-skill expert.
Lemma 9 In a single-acquisition equilibrium of the descending referral market, if the
low-skill expert fails to acquire information, then he rejects the equilibrium referral.
In contrast to the ascending referral market, Lemma 9 says that the low-skill
expert rejects an equilibrium referral after a failed information acquisition. The proof
is in the Appendix. The referred low-skill expert has comparative advantages in
low-cost projects. If he accepted referral after a failed information acquisition, he
would accept some high-cost projects. Such a referral would fail to exploit experts’
comparative advantages.
Lemma 10 In a single-acquisition equilibrium of the descending referral market, the
high-skill expert does not acquire information and refers at t∗ < αs1 + β.
Lemma 10 pins down the range of an equilibrium payment. The proof is in
the Appendix. In a single-acquisition equilibrium, the payment must be lower than
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αs1 +β. The high-skill expert would be tempted to acquire information and complete
ω1 himself if the equilibrium payment is higher than αs1 + β. A referral is feasible
only if it exploits experts’ comparative advantages by assigning low-cost projects to
the low-skill expert. Thus, the equilibrium payment is correspondingly low. The size
of the equilibrium payment determines the projects that the low-skill expert accepts.
The low-skill expert accepts a referral after a successful information acquisition if and
only if his project cost is lower than the payment. For example, if the payment is in
between s1 and s2, then the low-skill expert accepts project ω1 and rejects the others.
Lemma 11 shows the equilibrium strategies of a single-acquisition equilibrium when
equilibrium payment is within this range. The proof is similar to Proposition 1’s.
Lemma 11 In a descending referral market, there is a single-acquisition equilibrium
characterized by (θ∗l , t
∗), which satisfy k′(θ∗l ) = p1(t
∗− s1) and s1 < t∗ < s2. Here are
the equilibrium strategies and beliefs.
(i) The high-skill expert does not acquire information and refers the project at t∗.
If he succeeds in acquiring information, then he refers the project ω1 at t
∗ and
completes the rest. If he fails in acquiring information, then he refers the project
at t∗.
(ii) At t∗, the low-skill expert acquires information at probability θ∗l . If he succeeds
in acquiring information, he accepts project ω1 and rejects the rest. If he fails
in acquiring information, he rejects the referral. If he receives a referral at
t 6= t∗, he does not acquire information and rejects the referral. If he succeeds
in acquiring information at t 6= t∗, then he accepts if project cost is lower than
t. If he fails, then he rejects.
99
(iii) At an off-equilibrium payment, the high-skill expert believes the project is in
state ω5.
In a single-acquisition equilibrium, the high-skill expert relies on the referred low-
skill expert to acquire information. The two experts fail to coordinate information
acquisition. The low-skill expert acquires information in order to protect himself from
high-cost projects. However, it facilitates efficient assignment of projects. If (θ∗l , t
∗)
satisfy k′(θ∗l ) =
∑2
i pi(t
∗−si) and s2 < t∗ < αs1 +β instead, then the low-skill expert
accepts project ω1 and ω2 after a successful information acquisition. The equilibrium
payment in this case is higher.
If an equilibrium payment t∗ satisfies αs1 + β < t∗ < αs2 + β, then the high-skill
expert is tempted to acquire information in order to complete project ω1, ω3, ω4, and
ω5. He still refers project ω2. Indeed, this is the high-skill expert’s on-the-equilibrium-
path strategy in a double-acquisition equilibrium.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I provide a model to study a market where an expert who discovers a
project may not be the appropriate expert to complete the project. Therefore, experts
can improve efficiency by referring mismatched projects to each other. However, each
of the experts can only acquire imperfect information about projects. The chapter
intends to answer two questions. First, can experts refer at least some mismatched
projects to each other using a simple price contract in a market? Second, can the
two experts coordinate information-acquisition efforts in the market? The answer
the first question is positive. There exist referral equilibria. But the market cannot
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achieve the first best because the answer to the second question is negative. One
of the experts fails to use his information acquisition capability to improve social
efficiency. In some equilibria, he does not acquire information. In other equilibria,
he only acquires information to protect himself from getting difficult projects with
which he has comparative advantage in completing.
101
Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1
Proof of Lemma 1
I first provide (i)’s proof. Suppose not. Suppose that eˆl(q) > eˆh(q). Since the return
functions are strictly concave in e, the first-order conditions imply that ∂yl(eˆl,q)
∂e
=
∂yh(eˆh,q)
∂e
= 0. Because yl(e, q) is strictly concave in e and eˆl(q) > eˆh(q), it fol-
lows that ∂yh(eˆh,q)
∂e
< ∂yl(eˆh,q)
∂e
, which is a contradiction to the assumption ∂yh(e,q)
∂e
≥
∂yl(e,q)
∂e
. To prove (ii), note that by implicit function theorem we have deˆl(q)
dq
=
−∂2yl(eˆl(q),q)
∂e∂q
/∂
2yl(eˆl(q),q)
∂e2
. By assumption, ∂
2yl(e,q)
∂e∂q
> 0 and ∂
2yl(e,q)
∂e2
< 0. Therefore,
deˆl(q)
dq
> 0; deˆh(q)
dq
> 0 follows similarly. 
Proof of Lemma 2
I first prove that dSh(q)
dq
> dSl(q)
dq
> 0. By assumption, ∂yh(eˆl(q),q)
∂q
> ∂yl(eˆl(q),q)
∂q
> 0.
Because eˆh(q) ≥ eˆl(q) by Lemma 1 and ∂2yh(e,q)∂e∂q > 0 by assumption, I can say that
∂yh(eˆh(q),q)
∂q
> ∂yl(eˆl(q),q)
∂q
> 0. By the Envelope Theorem, dSl(q)
dq
= ∂yl(eˆl(q),q)
∂q
and dSh(q)
dq
=
∂yh(eˆh(q),q)
∂q
. Therefore, dSh(q)
dq
> dSl(q)
dq
> 0.
Now, I proceed to prove the rest of Lemma 2. First, I know Sh(0) < Sl(0) = 0
since maxe yl(e, 0) = maxe yh(e, 0) = 0. Second, Sh(q¯) > Sl(q¯) > 0 by assumption.
Since dSh(q)
dq
> dSl(q)
dq
> 0, intermediate value theorem says that there exists a unique
qfb ∈ Q such that Sl(qfb) = Sh(qfb) and a unique q∗ such that Sh(q∗) = 0. The rest
of Lemma 2 follows directly from dSh(q)
dq
> dSl(q)
dq
. 
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Proof of Lemma 4
Consider an equilibrium and any two projects q′ and q′′, with q′ < q′′. It is sufficient
to prove that ul(q
′′) ≥ ul(q′). Firms’ equilibrium strategies can be described by three
cases.
Case 1: The low-skill firm implements q′.
The low-skill firm implements q′ with eˆl(q′), so ul(q′) = Sl(q′). By the Envelope
Theorem, dSl(q)
dq
= ∂yl(eˆl(q),q)
∂q
, which is larger than zero by assumption. Sl(q
′′) >
Sl(q
′) = ul(q′) implies ul(q′′) > ul(q′).
Case 2: The low-skill firm refers q′ at p and the high-skill firm accepts it without
inspection.
First, ul(q
′) = p. The low-skill firm who has q′′ can at least attain payoff p because
the high-skill firm accepts a referral at p without inspection. Thus, ul(q
′′) ≥ ul(q′).
Case 3: The low-skill firm refers q′ at p. The high-skill firm inspects and accepts it.
First, ul(q
′) = p. Upon receiving p, the high-skill firm’s equilibrium strategy is to
inspect the referred project. The high-skill firm inspects and accepts q′ only if the
efficient surplus it can derive is larger than the referral price, which means Sh(q
′) ≥ p.
If the low-skill firm refers q′′ at p, the high-skill firm will inspect, learn that the project
potential is q′′ such that Sh(q′′) > Sh(q′) ≥ p, and accept the referral. The low-skill
firm who has q′′ can at least attain payoff p. Thus, ul(q′′) ≥ ul(q′). 
Proof of Lemma 5
Suppose not. Suppose there exists an equilibrium in which the high-skill firm accepts
referral price p without inspection and inf R(p) > 0. Consider a project q′ < inf R(p)
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and a project q′′ ∈ R(p). By Lemma 3, p ≥ Sl(q′′) > Sl(q′). By Lemma 4, ul(q′) ≤ p.
Since q′ /∈ R(p), we know ul(q′) < p. Because the high-skill firm accepts any referral
at p without inspection, the low-skill firm prefers referring project q′ at p to following
its equilibrium strategy and getting a payoff of ul(q
′) < p. A profitable deviation
exists for the low-skill firm with project q′. 
Proof of Lemma 6
Suppose not. Suppose that there exists an equilibrium in which the high-skill firm
accepts p′ without inspection. As discussed after Lemma 5, there cannot be multiple
equilibrium referral prices at which the high-skill firm accepts without inspection. By
Lemma 5, the corresponding referral set can be written as R(p′) = (0, qˆ), for a qˆ ∈ Q.
There are two cases.
Case 1: qˆ ≥ qfb.
In the continuation equilibrium in which the high-skill firm receives the price offer
p′, the high-skill firm believes µ(p′, q) = g(q)
G(qˆ)
for q ∈ R(p′) and µ(p′, q) = 0 for
q /∈ R(p′). Let q′ be the project such that p′ = Sh(q′). The high-skill firm does
not inspect the referred project if and only if the inspection cost is larger than the
incremental inspection surplus I(0, qˆ, p′);
c >
1
G(qˆ)
qˆ∫
max{0,q′}
[Sh(q)− p′]dG(q)−max
{
0,max
e
1
G(qˆ)
qˆ∫
0
[yh(e, q)− fh − p′]dG(q)
}
.
(A.1)
First, observe that q′ > 0. Second, the high-skill firm accepts without inspection
and implements the project only knowing that it is from the set (0, qˆ). The firm
does so only if the surplus it can derive is larger than the price, which means that
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maxe
1
G(qˆ)
∫ qˆ
0
[
yh(e, q) − fh − p′
]
dG(q) ≥ 0. Using the above two points, I rearrange
(A.1) to
c >
1
G(qˆ)
qˆ∫
q′
[
Sh(q)− p′
]
dG(q)−max
e
1
G(qˆ)
qˆ∫
0
[
yh(e, q)− fh − p′
]
dG(q),
which means
c >
1
G(qˆ)
[ q′∫
0
p′dG(q) +
qˆ∫
q′
Sh(q)dG(q)
]
−max
e
1
G(qˆ)
qˆ∫
0
[
yh(e, q)− fh
]
dG(q). (A.2)
Since p′ > Sh(q) for q < q′ and qˆ ≥ qfb, (A.2) contradicts Assumption A.
Case 2: qˆ < qfb.
The high-skill firm implements a referred project at price p′ without inspection
and only knowing that it is from the set (0, qˆ). This is an equilibrium only if the
high-skill firm’s expected surplus of doing so is larger than the referral price p′:
max
e
1
G(qˆ)
qˆ∫
0
{
yh(e, q)− fh
}
dG(q) ≥ p′. (A.3)
By Lemma 3, the low-skill firm refers a project q ∈ R(p′) = (0, qˆ) at price p′ only if
p′ ≥ Sl(q). These translate into one single constraint
p′ ≥ Sl(qˆ). (A.4)
Combining (A.3) and (A.4) I have
max
e
1
G(qˆ)
qˆ∫
0
{
yh(e, q)− fh
}
dG(q) ≥ Sl(qˆ). (A.5)
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Also, the high-skill firm’s efficient surplus with project qˆ is larger than its expected
surplus with a project from the set (0, qˆ) only knowing that the project is from (0, qˆ):
Sh(qˆ) > max
e
1
G(qˆ)
qˆ∫
0
{
yh(e, q)− fh
}
dG(q). (A.6)
Combining (A.5) and (A.6) gives me Sh(qˆ) > Sl(qˆ), which is a contradiction to Lemma
2 because qˆ < qfb. 
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) I(qam, qbm, pm) ≥ c and pm = Sh(qam) ≥ Sl(qbm), for m = 1, ..., n.
I(qam, qbm, pm) ≥ c follows from Lemma 6. By (1.6), an equilibrium price pm satisfies
Sh(q
a
m) ≥ pm ≥ Sl(qbm). Therefore I only need to prove that pm = Sh(qam). Suppose
not. Suppose that pm < Sh(q
a
m). There exists a q
′ < qam such that pm = Sh(q
′).
Consider the low-skill firm who has a project q such that q′ < q < qam. Since q /∈
R(pm), in the equilibrium the low-skill firm is supposed to either work on q or refer
q at some price p 6= pm. If the low-skill firm works on q, then it gets surplus Sl(q) <
Sl(q
a
m) ≤ pm. If the low-skill firm refers q at a price p, then by Lemma 4 p < pm.
In both scenarios, if the low-skill firm deviated to refer q at price pm, the high-skill
firm would inspect, find out that Sh(q) − pm = Sh(q) − Sh(q′) > 0, and accept. A
profitable deviation exists for the low-skill firm with project q.
(ii) qa1 > q
fb.
First, Sh(q
a
1) ≥ Sl(qb1) by (6). Second, I(qa1 , qb1, p1) ≥ c implies that qb1 > qa1 . There-
fore, Sh(q
a
1) ≥ Sl(qb1) > Sl(qa1), which implies that qa1 > qfb by Lemma 2.
(iii) If there exists q such that qbn < q < q¯, then pn = Sh(q
a
n) = Sl(q
b
n).
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Suppose not. Suppose that pn = Sh(q
a
n) > Sl(q
b
n). Consider the low-skill firm who
has a project q satisfying q > qbn and Sh(q
a
n) > Sl(q) > Sl(q
b
n). Since q is larger than
projects in each referral set, the low-skill firm’s equilibrium strategy calls for him
to work on q to get a payoff of Sl(q) < pn. However, if the low-skill firm deviated
and referred q at pn, the high-skill firm would inspect, learn that Sh(q) > Sh(q
b
n) >
Sh(q
a
n) = pn, and accept the referral. A profitable deviation exists for the low-skill
firm with project q.
(iv) If n ≥ 2 and there exists q such that qbj−1 < q < qaj , then pj−1 = Sh(qaj−1) =
Sl(q
b
j−1), for j = 2, ..., n.
The proof of (iv) is similar to (iii). Suppose not. Suppose that pj−1 = Sh(qaj−1) >
Sl(q
b
j−1). Consider the low-skill firm who has a project q satisfying q
a
j > q > q
b
j−1 and
Sh(q
a
m) > Sl(q) > Sl(q
b
m). Then, like the proof of (iii), the high-skill firm with project
q would profitably deviate from implementation to referral it at pm. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose project potentials qa1 < q
b
1 ≤ qa2 < qb2 ≤ ... ≤ qan < qbn and prices p1 <
p2 < ... < pn satisfy conditions (i) - (iv) in Proposition 1. Given the high-skill
firm’s strategies to inspect projects at prices pm = Sh(q
a
m) and reject projects at
prices p 6= pm, for m = 1, ..., n, due to pessimistic belief, I will derive the low-skill
firm’s best response. First, note that the low-skill firm would never refer projects
at off-equilibrium prices because the high-skill firm would reject them. Consider the
low-skill firm who has q ∈ (qam, qbm). I show that the low-skill firm’s best response is
to refer q at pm = Sh(q
a
m). At any equilibrium price, the high-skill firm inspects, then
it accepts if and only if it can derive a higher surplus than the price. If the low-skill
firm refers q at pm = Sh(q
a
m), then the high-skill firm accepts after inspection because
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Sh(q) ≥ Sh(qam) = pm. This leaves the low-skill firm a payoff of pm = Sh(qam). The low-
skill firm would not refer q at an lower equilibrium price to get a lower payoff. For m =
1, ..., n − 1, if the low-skill firm referred q at an equilibrium price p′ > pm = Sh(qam),
then the high-skill firm rejected after inspection because Sh(q) < Sh(q
a
m+1) ≤ p′.
Finally, if the low-skill firm implemented q with efficient effort eˆl(q), it would get a
payoff of Sl(q), which is smaller than pm because pm = Sh(q
a
m) ≥ Sl(qbm) ≥ Sl(q) by
the first condition (i) of Proposition 1.
Consider the low-skill firm who has q /∈ (qam, qbm). I show that the low-skill firm’s
best response is to implement q to get a payoff of Sl(q). There are three possible
scenarios.
Case 1: q < qa1 .
If the low-skill firm referred q at any equilibrium price p′ ≥ p1, then the high-skill
firm would reject after inspection because Sh(q) < Sh(q
a
1) ≤ p′. So the low-skill firm
prefers implementing the project.
Case 2: q > qbn.
The low-skill firm prefers implementing the project q to referring it at any equilibrium
price because Sl(q) > Sl(q
b
n) = Sh(q
a
n) = pn by the third condition (iii) of Proposition
1.
Case 3: n ≥ 2 and qbm < q < qam+1, for m = 1, ..., n− 1.
If the low-skill firm referred q at any equilibrium price p′′ ≥ pm+1 = Sh(qam+1), then the
high-skill firm would reject after inspection because Sh(q) < Sh(q
a
m+1) ≤ p′′. Also,
the low-skill firm would not refer q at any equilibrium price p′ ≤ Sh(qam) because
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p′ ≤ Sh(qam) = Sl(qbm) < Sl(q) by the fourth condition (iv) of Proposition 1. So the
low-skill firm prefers implementing the project q.
Finally, given the low-skill firm’s strategies, I derive the high-skill firm’s best
response. The high-skill firm inspects referred projects at an equilibrium price pm,
for m = 1, ..., n, because, by the first condition (i) of Proposition 1, each referral set
satisfies the incremental inspection constraint. By the production efficiency constraint
in the first condition (i) of Proposition 1, the high-skill firm learns that Sh(q) ≥ pm =
Sh(q
a
m), for all q ∈ (qam, qbm), accepts the referral, and implements the project with
efficient effort. Finally, the high-skill firm rejects referral at off-equilibrium prices
because it pessimistically believes that it will derive Sh(0) < 0 by accepting. 
Proof of Corollary 2
Let c′ and c′′ be the solutions to the following problems;
c′ = max
q′
I(q′, q¯, p) s.t. p = Sh(q′) ≥ Sl(q¯), and (A.7)
c′′ = max
q′′
I(q′′, q′′′, p) s.t. p = Sh(q′′) = Sl(q′′′) and q′′ < q′′′. (A.8)
And q′ and q′′ be the arguments maximizing the above problems;
q′ = argmaxq′ I
(
q′, q¯, p
)
s.t. p = Sh(q
′) ≥ Sl(q¯), and (A.9)
q′′ = argmaxq′′ I
(
q′′, q′′′, p
)
s.t. p = Sh(q
′′) = Sl(q′′′) and q′′ < q′′′. (A.10)
Consider an equilibrium with n ≥ 1 referral set. To begin with, c′ is the largest possi-
ble incremental inspection surplus of the n-th referral set with q¯ being the supremum
of the set. Also, c′′ is the largest possible incremental inspection surplus of a referral
set with the supremum of the set being smaller than q¯. They are found by maximizing
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the incremental inspection surplus subject to the production efficiency constraint in
(i) and (iii) of Proposition 1, respectively. By assumption A, inspection cost is smaller
than cA. Let cR = min{cA,max{c′, c′′}}. I first prove that a referral equilibrium ex-
ists only if c ≤ cR. The proof is by contrapositive. Suppose that c > cR. Then,
either Assumption A is violated or c > max{c′, c′′}. The latter means that no referral
set can be constructed to satisfy both the incremental inspection constraint and the
production efficiency constraint, and a referral equilibrium does not exist. Finally, I
prove that a referral equilibrium exists if c ≤ cR. Clearly, if c = cR, then there exists
an equilibrium with referral set (q′, q¯) or (q′′, S−1l (Sh(q
′′))). If c < cR, such an equi-
librium still exists because a lower inspection cost relaxes the incremental inspection
constraint. 
Proof of the Fifth Condition (v) of Proposition 3
First, suppose that n = 1.
By (i) and (iii) of Proposition 3, Sh(q
b
1) ≤ maxe 1G(qb1)
∫ qb1
0
yl(e, q) dG(q) < Sl(q
b
1),
which implies that qb2 < q
fb by Lemma 2. Second, suppose that n ≥ 1. By (iv)
of Proposition 3, Sl(q
a
n) ≥ Sh(qbn). Also, Il(qan, qbn, pn) ≥ c implies that qbn > qan.
Therefore, Sl(q
b
n) > Sl(q
a
n) ≥ Sh(qbn), which implies that qan < qfb by Lemma 2. 
Proof of Lemma 7
Suppose not. Suppose that in a monotone equilibrium some project q ≥ qa1 is not
referred. There are two cases.
Case 1: n ≥ 1 and qbn < q¯.
Consider the low-skill firm who proposes an off-equilibrium price p′ = Sh(qbn). The
first condition (i) of monotone belief in Definition 3 applies because of the following.
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First, p′ = Sh(qbn) > pn = Sh(q
a
n). Second, by Proposition 1, q
fb < qa1 , so Sl(q) < Sh(q)
for each q ∈ (qbn, q¯). Therefore, the high-skill firm believes that a referred project at
p′ comes from the subset K = (qbn, q¯). Given such belief, at p
′ = Sh(qbn) the high-skill
firm either inspects the project or accepts the offer without inspection. Therefore,
any projects q ≥ qbn would be accepted at p′ = Sh(qbn) regardless of the high-skill
firm’s inspection decision. If there exists q ∈ Q such that Sl(q) = Sh(qbn), then there
is a profitable deviation opportunity for the low-skill firm with projects q′′ satisfying
qbn ≤ q′′ < S−1l (Sh(qbn)) to refer at p′ = Sh(qbn) > Sl(q′′). If there does not exist q ∈ Q
such that Sl(q) = Sh(q
b
n), then there is a profitable deviation opportunity for the
low-skill firm with projects q′′ satisfying qbn ≤ q′′ ≤ q¯ to refer at p′ > Sl(q′′).
Case 2: n ≥ 2 and qbm < qam+1, for some m = 1, ..., n− 1.
Case 2’s proof is similar to Case 1’s. Consider the low-skill firm who proposes an
off-equilibrium price p′ = Sh(qbm). The second condition (ii) of Definition 3 applies
because pm < p
′ < pm+1. and Sl(q) < Sh(q) for each q ∈ (qbm, qam+1). Therefore,
the high-skill firm believes that a referred project at p′ comes from the subset K =
(qbm, q
a
m+1). Given such belief, at p
′ the high-skill firm either inspects the project or
accepts the offer without inspection. There is a profitable deviation opportunity for
the low-skill firm with projects q′′ satisfying qbm ≤ q′′ < qam+1 to refer at p′. 
Proof of Lemma 8
Consider a referral equilibrium with referral sets (qa1 , q
b
1), ..., (q
a
n, q
a
n) with each project
q ≥ qa1 being referred. I will replace the equilibrium’s belief with a monotone belief
according to Definition 3. The first condition (i) in Definition 3 is not applicable.
Although there exists prices higher than pn, the subset K = (q
b
n, q¯) has zero measure
because each project q ≥ qa1 is referred. The second condition (ii) in Definition 3 is not
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applicable for a similar reason. Finally, as discussed in the text, the third condition
(iii) is never applicable in ascending referral. Since none of (i)-(iii) is applicable,
monotone belief only imposes each off-equilibrium information set to have a positive
measure. Here is one example; at each off-equilibrium price p′, the high-skill firm
believes that the corresponding project is from the subset (0, S−1h (p
′)), which has a
positive measure. This construction is enough because prices must be larger than
zero and lower than Sh(q¯). the high-skill firm rejects any referral at off-equilibrium
price p′ because each project within (0, S−1h (p
′)) generates a surplus lower than p′.
The proof for a no-referral equilibrium is similar; all prices are off-equilibrium and
none of (i)-(iii) in Definition 3 is applicable.
Proof of Proposition 5
Suppose there exists an equilibrium σ, which has n ≥ 1 referral sets (qa1 , qb1), ..., (qan, qbn).
Also, I(q, qa1 , Sh(q)) < c for each q satisfying qa1 ≤ q ≤ S−1h (Sl(qa1)). Consider any
other equilibrium σˆ that satisfies monotone belief. I want to show that σˆ does not
interim Pareto dominate σ. Suppose σ has equilibrium payoff functions ul(q), q ∈ Q,
and uh. Also, suppose σˆ has equilibrium payoff functions uˆl(q), q ∈ Q, and uˆh and s
referral sets, (qˆa1 , qˆ
b
1), ...(qˆ
a
s , qˆ
b
s). There are two cases.
Case 1. There is a m satisfying 1 ≤ m ≤ n such that qam 6= qˆaj , for j = 1, ..., s.
In this case, there is a project qam that is an infimum of a referral set in equilibrium
σ but is not an infimum of any referral set in equilibrium σˆ. By Proposition 1,
ul(q
a
m) = pm = Sh(q
a
m). In equilibrium σˆ, the project q
a
m is either worked on by the
low-skill firm, which means that uˆl(q
a
m) = Sl(q
a
m) < Sh(q
a
m), or it is referred by a price
lower than Sh(q
a
m) because q
a
m is not an infimum of any referral set in equilibrium
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σˆ. Therefore, ul(q
a
m) = Sh(q
a
m) > uˆl(q
a
m) which means thatt σ is not interim Pareto
dominated by σˆ.
Case 2. There is a a j satisfying 1 ≤ j ≤ s such that qˆaj = qam, for m = 1, ..., n.
In this case, every project which is an infimum of a referral set in equilibrium σ
is also an infimum of a referral set in equilibrium σˆ. That means there are weakly
more referral sets in equilibrium σˆ; s ≥ n. First, by assumption there does not exist
q < qa1 such that Sh(q) ≥ Sl(qa1) and I(q, qa1 , Sh(q)) ≥ c, so there does not exist any
referral set with qa1 as supremum in equilibrium σˆ. Second, by Lemma 7, because
both equilibria σ and σˆ satisfy monotone belief, all q > qa1 and all q > qˆ
a
1 are referred
in equilibria σ and σˆ, respectively. Combining the above two points, I have qa1 = qˆ
a
1 . If
s = n, then the two equilibria share the same equilibrium strategies and allocations,
and σ is not interim Pareto dominated by σˆ.
Next, suppose that s > n. I will show that uh > uˆ2 and therefore σ is not interim
Pareto dominated by σˆ. Let p(q) and pˆ(q), q ∈ (qa1 , q¯), be the equilibrium referral
price in σ and σˆ, respectively. They are both functions of project potential. By
Proposition 1, p(q) = Sh(q
a
m), for q ∈ (qam, qbm) and m = 1, ..., n, and pˆ(q) = Sh(qaj ),
for q ∈ (qˆam, qˆbm) and m = 1, ..., s. Because every project which is an infimum of a
referral set in equilibrium σ is also an infimum of a referral set in equilibrium σˆ
pˆ(q) ≥ p(q) (A.11)
for all q ∈ (qa1 , q¯), with the inequality being strict for some q ∈ (qa1 , q¯). Therefore,
q¯∫
qa1
pˆ(q)dG(q) >
q¯∫
qa1
p(q)dG(q) (A.12)
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And
uh − uˆh
=
n∑
m=1
qbm∫
qam
(Sh(q)− pm − c) dG(q)−
s∑
m=1
qˆbm∫
qˆam
(Sh(q)− pˆm − c) dG(q)
=
s∑
m=1
qˆbm∫
qˆam
pˆm dG(q)−
n∑
m=1
qbm∫
qam
pm dG(q)
=
q¯∫
qa1
pˆ(q)dG(q)−
q¯∫
qa1
p(q)dG(q) > 0.
The last line is larger than zero by (A.12). 
Proof of Lemma 10
Let cˆ be:
cˆ =
qˆ∫
0
Sl(q) dG(q), (A.13)
with Sh(qˆ) = max
e
q¯∫
0
yl(e, q) dG(q). (A.14)
Suppose not. Suppose that c ≤ cˆ and there is an equilibrium in which the low-
skill firm refers a project at p without inspection and the high-skill firm inspects the
referred project. Call this equilibrium σ. The equilibrium price p must be larger than
the low-skill firm’s average surplus without project potential information;
p > max
e
q¯∫
0
yl(e, q) dG(q). (A.15)
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Let q′ be the project potential satisfying
Sh(q
′) = p (A.16)
By (A.14), (A.15) and (A.16), I know
p = Sh(q
′) > max
e
q¯∫
0
yl(e, q) dG(q) = Sh(qˆ).
That means
q′ > qˆ, and (A.17)
q′∫
0
Sl(q) dG(q) >
qˆ∫
0
Sl(q) dG(q) (A.18)
I will show that equilibrium σ generates contradiction to (A.18). Note that the
equilibrium satisfies pessimistic belief, so the high-skill firm rejects any price not
equal to p. The proof is divided into two cases.
Case 1: p ≤ Sl(q¯).
There exists a project q′′ such that p = Sl(q′′). The low-skill firm does not inspect
the project in stage 1 only if
q¯∫
q′
p dG(q) ≥
q′∫
0
Sl(q) dG(q) +
q′′∫
q′
p dG(q) +
q¯∫
q′′
Sl(q) dG(q)− c. (A.19)
The left-hand side of (A.19) is the low-skill firm’s surplus by referring a project to the
high-skill firm at p without inspection. After inspection, the high-skill firm accepts
if and only if the project potential is higher than q′, because p = Sh(q′). Otherwise,
the high-skill firm rejects and the game ends.
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The right-hand side of (A.19) is the low-skill firm’s surplus by inspecting and
referring some projects at p. After inspection, the low-skill firm implements projects
with potential lower than q′. As I have shown above, if the low-skill firm refers such
projects at p, then it will get rejected. Moreover, because p = Sl(q
′′), the low-skill
firm also implements projects with potential higher than q′′ instead of referring them
at p. For projects with potential in between q′ and q′′, the low-skill firm refers at p
and the high-skill firm accepts after inspection. I rearrange (A.19) to get
c ≥
q′∫
0
Sl(q) dG(q) +
q¯∫
q′′
[Sl(q)− p] dG(q). (A.20)
The second term on the right-hand side of (A.20) is larger than zero because p =
Sl(q
′′). By (A.20), c ≤ cˆ, and (A.13) I have
qˆ∫
0
Sl(q) dG(q) = cˆ ≥ c ≥
q′∫
0
Sl(q) dG(q) +
q¯∫
q′′
[Sl(q)− p] dG(q),
which is a contradiction to (A.18).
Case 2: p > Sl(q¯).
The low-skill firm does not inspect the project in stage 1 only if
q¯∫
q′
p dG(q) ≥
q′∫
0
Sl(q) dG(q) +
q¯∫
q′
p dG(q)− c. (A.21)
As in (A.19), the left-hand side of (A.21) is the low-skill firm’s surplus by referring
at p without inspection, whereas the right-hand side of (A.21) is the low-skill firm’s
surplus by inspecting and referring some projects at p. After inspection, the low-skill
firm implements projects with potential smaller than q′ to avoid the projects being
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rejected. The low-skill firm refers projects with potential larger than q′ at p because
p > Sl(q¯). Rearrange (A.21) to get
c ≥
q′∫
0
Sl(q) dG(q). (A.22)
Combine (A.22) with c ≤ cˆ and (A.13) to have ∫ qˆ
0
Sl(q) dG(q) = cˆ ≥ c ≥
∫ q′
0
Sl(q) dG(q),
which is a contradiction to (A.18). 
Proof of Proposition 7
Let c′ be
c′ =
q¯∫
0
Sl(q)dG(q)−max
e
q¯∫
0
yl(e, q)dG(q) (A.23)
The proof is divided into two cases.
Case 1: maxe
∫ q¯
0
yl(e, q) dG(q) < maxe
∫ q¯
0
[yh(e, q)− fh] dG(q).
Let c′′ be the solution to the following program:
min
x
I(0, q¯, x) (A.24)
s.t. max
e
q¯∫
0
yl(e, q) dG(q) < x < max
e
q¯∫
0
[yh(e, q)− fh] dG(q). (A.25)
Because of the constraint (A.25), c′′ > 0. Let c˜ = min{cˆ, c′, c′′}, with cˆ being char-
acterized by (A.13) and (A.14) in the proof of Lemma 10. I will prove that if c ≤ c˜,
then the low-skill firm refers or implements a project only after inspection. Clearly,
there does not exist an equilibrium in which the low-skill firm implements without
inspection because c ≤ c′.
117
Suppose not. Suppose that c ≤ c˜ and there exists an equilibrium such that the
low-skill firm does not inspect and refers a project to the high-skill firm at price p.
Because c ≤ cˆ, by Lemma 10, in this equilibrium, the low-skill firm refers without
inspection at p and the high-skill firm accepts without inspection. First, the low-skill
firm refers without inspection only if the equilibrium price is larger than the low-
skill firm’s average surplus without potential information. Second, the high-skill firm
accepts without inspection only if its average surplus without potential information is
larger than the equilibrium price. Therefore, p satisfies maxe
∫ q¯
0
yl(e, q) dG(q) < p <
maxe
∫ q¯
0
[yh(e, q) − fh] dG(q). Third, the high-skill firm does not inspect at p if and
only if I(0, q¯, p) < c. By (A.24) and (A.25), these three points combined contradicts
c ≤ c′′ .
Case 2: maxe
∫ q¯
0
[yh(e, q)− fh] dG(q) ≤ maxe
∫ q¯
0
yl(e, q) dG(q).
Let c˜ = min{cˆ, c′}. Following the same logic above, I only have to prove that there
does not exist an equilibrium such that the low-skill firm refers a project to the high-
skill firm without inspection at price p. Suppose not. Suppose that c ≤ c˜ and such an
equilibrium exists. By Lemma 10, the low-skill firm refers without inspection at p and
the high-skill firm accepts without inspection. Therefore, p satisfies maxe
∫ q¯
0
[yh(e, q)−
fh] dG(q) > p > maxe
∫ q¯
0
yl(e, q) dG(q), which is a contradiction to the premise of
Case 2. 
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
Proof of Lemma 3
s¯∫
0
Vl(x)dG(x)− f ≥ Vl(µl)
s¯∫
0
[
t(0)−
y∫
0
pl(x)dx
]
dG(y)− f ≥ tl(0)−
µl∫
0
pl(x)dx
f ≤
µl∫
0
pl(x)dx−
s¯∫
0
[ y∫
0
pl(x)dx
]
dG(y)
f ≤
µl∫
0
pl(x)dx−
[
G(y)
y∫
0
p(x)dx
]s¯
0
+
s¯∫
0
G(y)p(y)dy
f ≤
µl∫
0
pl(x)dx−
s¯∫
0
(1−G(x))pl(x)dx
f ≤
s¯∫
0
G(x)pl(x)dx−
s¯∫
µl
pl(x)dx
f ≤
µl∫
0
G(x)pl(x)dx−
s¯∫
µl
(1−G(x))pl(x)dx.
In the above, the second line is due to substitution of (2.11) into (2.6) and the fourth
line is due to integration by parts.
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Proof of Proposition 1
Case 1: sfb < µl.
First, I show that sfb < µl implies that µh < µl when ch(s) is concave. Suppose
ch(s) is concave. Therefore, µh = E(ch(s)) ≤ ch(E(s)) = ch(µl). Since sfb < µl,
ch(µl) < µl. Combine the two inequalities together, I have µh < µl. Clearly, a linear
cost function ch(s) = αs+β is also concave. However, this proof applies when I study
a concave ch(s) later.
Suppose pl(s) = 1 for s ≤ sfb and pl(s) = 0 for s > sfb. Such a probability assign-
ment function is decreasing. Plug pl(s) into the R.H.S. of (2.20) to get
∫ sfb
0
G(x)dx.
Therefore, if f ≤ ∫ sfb
0
G(x)dx, then a contract consisting of an efficient allocation rule
can incentivize information acquisition and assigns projects to the expert who has the
lowest cost. Recall that the first best requires information acquisition if and only if
f ≤ min{ ∫ sfb
0
[
β−(1−α)x]dG(x), ∫ s¯
sfb
[
(1−α)x−β]dG(x)}. Since µh < µl and as dis-
cussed in Section 2.2, the first best requires information acquisition if and only if f ≤∫ sfb
0
[
β−(1−α)x]dG(x). If I can prove that ∫ sfb
0
G(x)dx−∫ sfb
0
[
β−(1−α)x]dG(x) > 0,
then whenever f ≤ ∫ sfb
0
[
β − (1−α)x]dG(x), the Principal can use an optimal infor-
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mation contract to implement the first best. It is true as shown below.
sfb∫
0
G(x)dx−
sfb∫
0
[
β − (1− α)x]dG(x)
=
sfb∫
0
G(x)dx−
[(
β − (1− α)x)G(x)]sfb
0
+
sfb∫
0
G(x)d
(
β − (1− α)x)
=
sfb∫
0
G(x)dx−
sfb∫
0
G(x)dx+
sfb∫
0
αG(x)dx
=
sfb∫
0
αG(x)dx > 0.
When f >
∫ sfb
0
[
β − (1 − α)x]dG(x), then the Principal can use an optimal no-
information contract to implement the first best.
Case 2: µl ≤ sfb.
First, I show that µl ≤ sfb implies that µl ≤ µh when ch(s) is convex. Suppose ch(s)
is convex. Therefore, µh = E(ch(s)) ≥ ch(E(s)) = ch(µl). Since µl ≤ sfb, ch(µl) ≥ µl.
Combine the two inequalities together, I have µh ≥ µl. Clearly, a linear cost function
ch(s) = αs + β is also convex. However, this proof applies when I study a convex
ch(s) later. Plug pl(s) = 1 for s ≤ sfb and pl(s) = 0 for s > sfb into the R.H.S.
of (2.20) to get
∫ µl
0
G(x)dx − ∫ sfb
µl
(1 − G(x))dx, which is larger than zero because
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∫ µl
0
G(x)dx− ∫ s¯
µl
(1−G(x))dx = 0 as shown below.
µl∫
0
G(x)dx−
s¯∫
µl
(1−G(x))dx
=
s¯∫
0
G(x)dx−
s¯∫
µl
dx
=
[
G(x)x
]s¯
0
−
s¯∫
0
xdG(x)−
[
x
]s¯
µl
=0.
Therefore, if f ≤ ∫ µl
0
G(x)dx − ∫ sfb
µl
(1 − G(x))dx, then a contract consisting of an
efficient allocation rule can incentivize information acquisition and assigns projects to
the expert who has the lowest cost. The first best requires information acquisition if
and only if f ≤ min{ ∫ sfb
0
[
β − (1− α)x]dG(x), ∫ s¯
sfb
[
(1− α)x− β]dG(x)}. However,
µh =
∫ s¯
0
αx+βdG(x) = αµl +β ≥ µl since µl ≤ sfb. Therefore, the first best requires
information acquisition if and only if f ≤ ∫ s¯
sfb
[
(1 − α)x − β]dG(x). If I can prove
that
∫ µl
0
G(x)dx − ∫ sfb
µl
(1 − G(x))dx − ∫ s¯
sfb
[
(1 − α)x − β]dG(x) > 0, then whenever
f ≤ ∫ s¯
sfb
[
(1− α)x− β]dG(x), the Principal can use an optimal information contract
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to implement the first best. It is true as shown below.
µl∫
0
G(x)dx−
sfb∫
µl
(1−G(x))dx−
s¯∫
sfb
[
(1− α)x− β]dG(x)
=
sfb∫
0
G(x)dx−
sfb∫
µl
dx−
[(
(1− α)x− β)G(x)]s¯
sfb
+
s¯∫
sfb
G(x)d
(
(1− α)x− β)
=
s¯∫
0
G(x)dx−
s¯∫
sfb
αG(x)dx− [x]sfbµl − [s¯− αs¯− β]
=
[
G(x)x
]s¯
0
−
s¯∫
0
xdG(x)−
s¯∫
sfb
αG(x)dx− sfb + µl − s¯+ αs¯+ β
=−
s¯∫
sfb
αG(x)dx− sfb + αs¯+ β
=−
s¯∫
sfb
αG(x)dx− αsfb − β + αsfb + β +
s¯∫
sfb
αdx
=
s¯∫
sfb
αdx−
s¯∫
sfb
αG(x)dx > 0.
When f >
∫ s¯
sfb
[
(1 − α)x − β]dG(x), then the Principal can use an optimal no-
information contract to implement the first best. 
Proof of Lemma 4
Suppose a contract
(
tl(s), th(s), pl(s)
)
satisfies the high-skill expert’s truthful-reporting
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constraint. Assume without loss of generality that s ≥ sˆ. Then,
tl(s)− pl(s)(αs+ β) ≥ tl(sˆ)− pl(sˆ)(αs+ β), and
tl(sˆ)− pl(sˆ)(αsˆ+ β) ≥ tl(s)− pl(s)(αsˆ+ β).
Add them together to get
−pl(s)s− pl(sˆ)sˆ ≥ −pl(sˆ)s− pl(s)sˆ
(sˆ− s)(pl(s)− pl(sˆ)) ≥ 0,
which implies that pl(s) < pl(sˆ).
Proof of Proposition 2
Let pˆh(s) be the solution of Program 2. Below, I show that pˆh(s) is a constant ∀s.
Suppose not. Suppose that pˆh(s) is not a constant for ∀s. Consider the following
term.
sfb∫
0
(
pˆh(s)− pˆh(sfb)
)
(αs+ β − s)dG(s) +
s¯∫
sfb
(
pˆh(s
fb)− pˆh(s)
)
(s− αs− β)dG(s).
Note that αs+β ≥ s by definition and pˆh(s) ≥ pˆh(sfb) because pˆh(s) is non-increasing,
for s ≤ sfb. For the same reason, s ≥ αs + β and pˆh(sfb) ≥ pˆh(s), for s > sfb.
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Therefore,
sfb∫
0
(
pˆh(s)− pˆh(sfb)
)
(αs+ β − s)dG(s) +
s¯∫
sfb
(
pˆh(s
fb)− pˆh(s)
)
(s− αs− β)dG(s) ≥ 0
s¯∫
0
(
pˆh(s)− pˆh(sfb)
)
(αs+ β − s)dG(s) ≥ 0
s¯∫
0
pˆh(s)(αs+ β − s)dG(s) ≥
s¯∫
0
pˆh(s
fb)(αs+ β − s)dG(s)
s¯∫
0
[
pˆh(s)(αs+ β) +
(
1− pˆh(s)
)
s
]
dG(s) ≥
s¯∫
0
[
pˆh(s
fb)(αs+ β) +
(
1− pˆh(sfb)
)
s
]
dG(s),
which is a contradiction as pˆh(s) is a solution to Program 2 and is not a constant.
Now I have established that pˆh(s) is a constant for ∀s. Let pˆh(s) = p. Plug it into
Program 2. Clearly, pˆh(s) = p satisfies the non-increasing constraint in Program 2.
min
p
s¯∫
0
[
(1− p)x+ p(αx+ β)
]
dG(x)
= min
p
(1− p)µl + pµh.
Therefore, pˆh(s) = 1 if µh ≤ µl and pˆh(s) = 0 otherwise. And the solution to
Program 2 is min{µl, µh}, which is the Principal’s expected payment in an optimal
no-information equilibrium. In the text before and after Lemma 4, I have argued that
the Principal’s expected equilibrium payment of a high-skill information equilibrium
must be larger than the solution to Program 2. 
Proof of Proposition 3
First, I show that λ ≥ 0. Then, I show that no matter the magnitude of λ, the
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assignment probability function pl(s) in the solution to Program 1 must be in one of
the two forms described by Proposition 3. To check if pl(s) is a candidate of a solution
to Program 1, I look at the Lagrangian of the relaxed problem Program 1∗. I check if
I can adjust pl(s) point-wise according to the first-order point-wise derivative of the
Lagrangian without violating the monotonicity condition. If I cannot, then pl(s) is a
candidate.
Recall that µl ≤ sfb and µh < µl. It is point-wise optimal to set pl(s) = 1 if
∆(s) ≥ 0 and p(s) = 0 otherwise. Whether ∆(s) is positive or negative depends on
the term in the square bracket. Define D(s) to be that term.
D(s) ≡

ch(s)− s+ λk(s), if s < µl, and
ch(s)− s− λh(s), if s ≥ µl.
(B.1)
Note that it is optimal to set pl(s) = 1 for s ≤ µl and pl(s) = 0 for s ≥ sfb. Doing
so minimizes the objective function and relaxes (2.20) in Program 1∗. Therefore, I
only have to figure out the probability assignment for s between µl and s
fb. Since
pl(s
fb) = 0, that means D(sfb) ≤ 0. Since D(sfb) = −λh(sfb), λ is positive. Indeed,
D(sfb) = −λh(sfb) < 0 and D′′(s) = c′′h(s)− λh′′(s) < 0 because ch(s) is concave and
h(s) is convex. There are two cases.
Case 1: D(µl) > 0.
Since D(sfb) < 0 and D′′(s) < 0, D(s) > 0 for s ≤ s′ and D(s) < 0 for s > s′ with
µl < s
′ < sfb. It is optimal to set pl(s) = 1 for s ≤ s′ and pl(s) otherwise. To find s′,
note that (2.20) is binding in a solution. Plug in the above probability function to
get f =
∫ µl
0
k(x)dG(x) − ∫ s′
µl
h(x)dG(x), which determines s′. Finally, note that the
above probability assignment function satisfies the monotonicity condition, so it is a
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solution to Program 1∗.
Case 2: D(µl) < 0.
Note that D(sfb) < 0. There are two possibilities. First, D(s) ≤ 0 for s satisfying
µl ≤ s ≤ sfb. Then, it is optimal to set pl(s) = 1 for s ≤ µl and pl(s) = 0 otherwise.
Again, this satisfies the monotonicity condition, so it is a solution to Program 1∗.
Second, D(s) > 0 for some s satisfying µl < s < s
fb. Since D(sfb) < 0 and
D′′(s) < 0, I have D(s) ≤ 0 for µl ≤ s <≤ s′ and D(s) > 0 for s′ < s < s′′ and
D(s) ≤ 0 for s′′ ≤ s ≤ sfb, with µl < s′ < s′′ < sfb. Clearly, in this case, the Principal
optimally sets pl(s) = 1 for s < µl and pl(s) = 0 for s ≥ s′′. The question is how the
Principal should set pl(s) for s ∈ [µl, s′′).
I show that if the Principal sets pl(s) as a constant function for the range s ∈
[µl, s
′′), then it cannot be adjusted without violating the monotonicity condition. I
prove that by contradiction. I show that if pl(s) is not a constant function over this
range, then I can increase or decrease the function point-wise according to the point-
wise derivative to improve the Principal’s payoff without violating the monotonicity
condition. There are two cases to consider.
Case 2i: pl(sˆ) at sˆ ∈ [µl, s′].
By the above, D(sˆ) ≤ 0. Suppose not. Suppose that pl(sˆ) is not differentiable at
this point or p′l(sˆ) 6= 0. By the monotonicity condition, pl(sˆ) < pl(sˆ) for any sˆ > sˆ.
However, I can decrease pl(sˆ) to improve the Principal’s payoff without violating the
monotonicity condition since D(sˆ) ≤ 0 and pl(sˆ) < pl(sˆ) for any sˆ > sˆ, which is a
contradiction.
Case 2ii: pl(sˆ) at sˆ ∈ (s′, s′′).
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By the above, D(sˆ) > 0. Suppose not. Suppose that pl(sˆ) is not differentiable at this
point or p′l(sˆ) 6= 0. By the monotonicity condition, pl(s) < pl(sˆ) for any s > sˆ. There
exists an  > 0 such that D(sˆ) > 0 and pl(sˆ) < pl(sˆ) for any sˆ satisfying sˆ < sˆ < sˆ+.
However, I can increase pl(sˆ) so that pl(sˆ) = pl(sˆ) to improve the Principal’s payoff
without violating the monotonicity condition since D(sˆ) > 0 and pl(sˆ) < pl(sˆ) for
any sˆ satisfying sˆ < sˆ < sˆ+ , which is a contradiction.
Therefore, case 2 shows that a candidate of a solution to Program 1∗ is that pl(s) =
1 for all s ≤ µl, pl(s) = a, for all s satisfying µl < s < s′′ < sfb, pl(s) = 0 for all s ≥ s′′.
Also, because (2.20) is binding, a and s′′ satisfy f =
∫ µl
0
k(x)dG(x)−∫ s′′
µl
ah(x)dG(x).

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Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 3
Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose not. Suppose the low-skill expert refers a project without knowing the
project state at t′ < αs5 + β. The high-skill expert must be acquiring information at
t′. Suppose the high-skill expert acquires information at probability θ′′ > 0. Then, if
he succeeds, he rejects at least some projects.
Case 1: αs4 + β ≤ t < αs5 + β.
The high-skill expert rejects project ω5. Then, the low-skill expert’s effective cost in
handling a project with uncertain state is θ′′(p5s5 + (1− p5)t′) + (1− θ′′)s3, which is
larger than his own cost s3.
Case 2: αs3 + β ≤ t < αs4 + β.
The high-skill expert rejects projects ω4 and ω5. Then, the low-skill expert’s effective
cost in handling a project with uncertain state is θ′′(p4s4 + p5s5 + (1− p4 − p5)t′) +
(1− θ′′)s3, which is larger than s3.
Case 3: αs2 + β ≤ t < αs3 + β.
The high-skill expert rejects projects ω3, ω4, and ω5. Then, the low-skill expert’s
effective cost in handling a project with uncertain state is θ′′(p3s3 + p4s4 + p5s5 +
(p1 + p2)t
′) + (1− θ′′)s3, which is larger than s3 because t′ > s2.
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Case 4: αs1 + β ≤ t < αs2 + β.
The high-skill expert rejects projects ω2, ω3, ω4, and ω5. Then, the low-skill expert’s
effective cost in handling a project with uncertain state is θ′′(p2s2 + p3s3 + p4s4 +
p5s5 + p1t
′) + (1− θ′′)s3, which is larger than s3 because t′ > s2. 
Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose not. Suppose there exists an equilibrium in which the low-skill expert does
not acquire information. By Lemma 1, the low-skill expert does not refer projects and
gets a payoff s3. But the low-skill expert can always deviate to acquire some informa-
tion and refer s5 at αs5 +β whenever information acquisition is successful. The high-
skill expert accepts regardless of belief without information acquisition. The deviation
generates a higher payoff: maxθ
{
θ
[∑4
i=1 pisi+p5(αs5+β)
]
+(1−θ)s3+k(θ)
}
< s3. 
Proof of Lemma 3
Suppose not. Suppose that the low-skill expert at least refers one of the three projects
at payment t′ after a successful information acquisition.
Case 1: The high-skill expert accepts t′ without information acquisition.
That means, there is no uncertainty underlying t′. But the high-skill expert doesn’t
have comparative advantage in handling the project. There is no payment which can
facilitate the trade.
Case 2: The high-skill expert acquires information at t′.
After a successful information acquisition, the high-skill expert accepts the project
with the lowest state that is pooled at t′. Suppose it is ω1. Then, t′ > αs1 + β. The
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low-skill would profitably deviate to complete ω1 himself since his cost is s1 < αs1 +β.
The cases if the project is ω2 or ω3 is similar. 
Proof of Lemma 4
By Lemma 3, it would not be profitable for the low-skill expert to refer projects ω1,
ω2, and ω3 after a successful information acquisition. Suppose that there are at least
two equilibrium payment t′ and t′′, with t′ < t′′. Then, by Lemma 1, the low-skill
expert refers either project ω4 or ω5 at t
′ and refers the other at t′′ after a successful
information acquisition. And the high-skill expert accepts t′ or t′′ without informa-
tion acquisition. But the high-skill expert can profitably deviate by pooling ω4 and
ω5 at t
′′. 
Proof of Proposition 1
Given the low-skill expert’s equilibrium strategy. The high-skill expert expert
does not acquire information at any payment because when t ≥ αs5 + β the payment
is higher than his project cost in any state. And he believes that the project is in state
ω5 if t < αs5 + β. For the same logic, he accepts t ≥ αs5 + β and rejects t < αs5 + β.
Given the high-skill expert’s equilibrium strategy. The low-skill expert refers
projects ω4 and ω5 because t
∗ = αs5 + β < s4. He completes the project in
other scenarios by Lemmas 1 and 3. He acquires information at θ∗l which solves
minθ
{
θ(
∑5
i=4 pit
∗ +
∑3
i=1 pisi) + (1 − θ)s3 + k(θ)
}
, which implies that k′(θ∗l ) =∑5
i=4 pi(si − αs5 − β).
This equilibrium always exists because k′(θ∗l ) =
∑5
i=4 pi(si−αs5−β) is always sat-
isfied. And the above single-acquisition equilibrium is unique because if t∗ < αs5 +β,
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then the high-skill expert would acquire information. 
Proof of Lemma 8
Suppose not. Suppose that the low-skill expert does not acquire information in an
equilibrium. Since the low-skill expert has no incentive to acquire information, the
high-skill acquires information and refer a project of a specific type in the equilibrium.
Case 1: project ω1 is referred.
For the high-skill expert to refer and the low-skill expert to accept ω1 at t
∗, s1 <
t∗ < αs1 + β. Since the low-skill expert accepts without information acquisition, the
high-skill expert would deviate to refer projects ω2, ω3, ω4, and ω5 at t
∗, which is a
contradiction.
Case 2: projects ω2 and ω3 are referred.
The proof of this case is similar to case 1’s.
Case 3: project ω4 or ω5 is referred.
The low-skill expert doesn’t have comparative advantage in completing project ω4 or
ω5, so no referral can be conducted. 
Proof of Lemma 9
Suppose not. Suppose the high-skill expert accepts an equilibrium referral after a
failed information acquisition in a single-acquisition equilibrium.
Case 1: t∗ < s3
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In a single-acquisition equilibrium, the referring high-skill expert does not acquire
information and refers the project. The expected cost of the project for the high-skill
expert is s3. Therefore, the equilibrium payment is not enough to cover the cost. The
low-skill expert rejects the project after a failed information acquisition.
Case 2: s3 ≤ t∗ ≤ s4
Since the low-skill expert acquires information, he accepts projects ω1, ω2, and ω3 and
rejects the rest when his information acquisition succeeds. Therefore, the high-skill
expert ex ante cost in the beginning of stage 1 is θ∗l
(∑3
i=1 pit
∗ +
∑5
i=4 pi(αsi + β)
)
+
(1− θ∗l )t∗ > s3. The high-skill expert can profitably deviate to complete the project
himself rather than following the equilibrium strategy.
Case 3: s4 ≤ t∗ ≤ s5
The proof in this case in similar to the case 2’s. 
Proof of Lemma 10
Suppose not. Suppose that the high-skill expert refers at t∗ ≥ αs1 + β without
information acquisition in a single-acquisition equilibrium. The high-skill expert’s
ex ante cost is at least t∗. But he can profitably deviate to acquire information
since k(θ) + θ(p1αs1 + β +
∑5
i=2 pit
∗ + (1 − θ)t∗) ≤ t∗ for really small θ because
limθ→0 k′(θ) = 0. 
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